HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS IN
INDONESIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Abstract
The theoretical debate in area of civil-military relations has been dominated by separation theories which recognize the distinction between civilian and military institutions, and the interaction between them should be maintained as in a form that civilian holds control over the military. However, Rebecca Schiff proposes the concordance theory as an alternative that suggests a form of integration between the military and society. This theory of concordance is used as a model of analysis for addressing historical and cultural factors in Indonesian civil-military relations. The study uses the four aspects of concordance as instruments to measure on what level of agreement can be achieved among the military, political elites, and society. The result shows that although historical and cultural factors have played important roles in shaping civil-military relations in Indonesia, they fail to build good civil-military relations which is based on the idea of civilian supremacy.

Keywords: the concordance theory, civil-military relations, historical and cultural factors, civilian supremacy.

1. INTRODUCTION
The existence of civilian supremacy over military is a key factor in understanding civil military relations where the current theories hold that civil supremacy over military is the sine qua non of civil-military relations. The issues first raised by Huntington in 1957 included the dominant notion that military could not undertake other roles, such as direct or even indirect involvement in domestic politics, without impairing their essential military capabilities. This means that there has to be a distinction tasks undertaken by civil and military organization within a government, and military should remain physically and ideologically separated from civilian political institutions in order to prevent domestic military intervention.

By contrast, Rebecca L. Schiff in *Armed Forces & Society* journal proposes a theory of concordance as an alternative approach that argues that three partners – the military, the political elites, and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but does not require it. The theory sees a high level of integration between the military and the other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship. Because all such relationships reflect specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by the three partners, no single type is seen as leading to an ideal type of relationship.

In the concordance theory, Schiff criticizes the two major problem of the current theory of separation that the concordance theory resolves. First, the current theory is derived largely from the experience of the United States, and assumes that American institutional separation on civil-military relations should be applied to all nations. Moreover, she argues that the case of civil-military relations in the United States is grounded in a particular historical and cultural experience and may be inapplicable to other countries. Second, the current theory argues for the separation of civil and military institutions which institutional analysis is the theory’s centerpiece. Schiff argues that this method of analysis fails to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may encourage or discourage civil-military separation. Moreover, the Concordance theory argues that if the cultural conditions have successfully constructed agreement among the military, the political elites, and the society, then the civilian supremacy will be maintained.

On the other hand, Indonesia civil-military relationship has strongly been influenced by particular historical experience and cultural factors since the state independence in 1945. However, it is also true that Indonesia has suffered a longstanding military intervention into civilian political spheres. This contradicts to Schiff’s argument in the Concordance theory. It is, therefore, interesting to explore in this study how historical and cultural factors have affected Indonesia civil-military relations and to explain why they fail to prevent domestic military intervention.

In addressing how the historical and cultural factors affect civil-military relations in Indonesia, the study focuses on measuring those factors in the four areas of concordance: (1) the social composition of the officer corps, (2) the political decision-making process, (3) the recruitment method, and (4) the military style.

1. Composition of the Officer Corps

The concordance theory recognizes the composition of military elites as a primary element in addressing civil-military relations. The officer corps is defined as the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military. They usually represent the various constituencies of the nation. In Indonesia, this element is very crucial due to the plurality of the nation. It is important to note that Indonesia has more than 3,000 ethnic groups throughout the archipelago of more than 14,000 islands. The cultural difference among ethnicities and nation’s components may lead to a various articulation that affects the agreement of the three partners over the composition of the officer corps.

There is also another problem in addressing the composition of the Indonesian military officers that the related researches and literatures were very limited in contributing information about social and cultural background within the Indonesian officer’s corps. There are two reasons for this difficulty. First, Indonesian military, and Indonesian people in general, are prone to avoid inter-relating their professions with their ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds. The terms of *SARA*-Suku, Agama, Ras, or ethnicity, religions, and race is viewed as a potential source for communal

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violence that threatens the unity of the nation, therefore, it should be disregarded as much as possible. Although many civilian and military leaders claim that neither religion nor ethnicity will be regarded in official assignments, in fact, these cultural elements, more or less, still play significant roles in any process of recruitments and promotions. Second, as Kammen and Chandra state that military is likely to safeguard information about its inner structure and activities. The issue of “national security” is always being an acceptable justification for military to keep its secrecy.

Despite the scarcity of the current data about cultural background of Indonesian military officers, the research focuses on two aspects of culture in analyzing composition of the officers. Those cultural factors are ethnicity and religions of the military officers. It also should be noticed, as it noted earlier, that the research takes the army as primary emphasis based on the reality that from its earliest time, the Indonesian army has been played a significant role representing military in discourse of civil-military relation in Indonesia.

First, ethnicity in Indonesian military officers tends to parallel the country’s population as a whole, although precise percentages of the various ethnic groups at senior levels of the TNI do not exactly reflect the percentage of ethnic groups in the country population. The current data shows that Javanese dominated across the military elites. Local recruitment of enlisted soldiers tends to concentrate Javanese in the many units on the island of Java. And they also tend to be well represented in the off-Java units as well, reflecting both the preponderance of Javanese in the Indonesian population at large and their residency throughout the country.

The domination of military by Javanese is not merely caused by its bigger proportion in population, but also by historical reason. First, most of the early Indonesian military officers, including Sudirman and Suharto, came from the PETA that established by Japanese in Java Island. During the World War II, the Japanese army controlled Java and Sumatra, whereas the navy ruled East Indonesia. In practical level, the Japanese army applied different policies from the navy, including the decision to establish PETA, while people in outsider islands had a little experience of military training. Second, Indonesian revolution for independence was largely fought on the island of Java. Therefore, the Indonesian military was firstly established and developed within the context of independence struggle in Java Island. Outside Java, the independence wars against the Dutch were conducted by informal resistance and militia groups, not by the army that was officially established in Java on October 5, 1945. After the Dutch recognition of Indonesia’s independence in 1949, many of militias groups outside Java expressed their disappointment of the central government decision to integrate ex-Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL-Koninklijk Nederlandsch - Indische Leger) into the Indonesian armed forces. This was to bring several rebellions at outsider islands, such as PRRI/Permesta rebellions in Sumatera and Sulawesi.

As the consequence of the Javanese domination in the officer corps, Indonesian military culture has been constructed by strong Javanese values and traditions. The significant Javanese cultural heritage that can be found in the military is the integration of governmental and military leadership. According to Cheong, the Javanese political behavior can be characterized by its concern over the accumulation and concentration of power. This is similar with Peter Britton’s argument that, in the past, the Javanese kings often came from great warriors who always referred themselves as ksatrias or knights with noble qualities. Therefore, analyzing Javanese culture provides us an explanation why the Indonesian military

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that dominated by Javanese officers tends to intervene in civilian political affairs.

Second, in contrast to the ethnicity factor within the TNI where Javanese as majority plays significant roles in shaping the military culture, the fact of a big number of Muslim population in Indonesia does not represent a strong Islamic influence in military. The predominance of the Javanese in the officer corps has an important consequence for the political orientation of the military. Unlike the people of the Outer Islands who are in general unambiguously Islamic in religious commitment, Javanese is much referred as Muslim *abangan*, whose adherence to Islam is often tenuous and combined with non-Islamic beliefs and practices. For longstanding civil-military relations in Indonesia, the Indonesian military as an institution has been distrustful of political Islam resulting in continuing tension between those two fractions. The relations between the military and Islam can be explained through two arguments. First, there is suspicion in the military that sees political Islam as a threat to the stability of the state. Second, the military leadership has itself been largely dominated by the secular nationalist group.

The military’s experience in suppressing political Islam dates back to the revolution and the Muslims rebellions in the 1950s and 1960s. The first tension was between the *Lasykar Hisbullah*, an Islamic militia unit under the *Masyumi* (Muslim Party), with the army in 1945. *Lasykar Hisbullah* refused to integrate into the army when the government declared the formation of the BKR (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*), the former name of the TNI, on 5 October 1945. In 1950s and 1960s, there were various *Darul Islam* rebellions in Java and Sulawesi, which their objective was to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia. However, these conflicts can also be seen as disputes between local and central government troops.

Apart from those conflicts, there have been a number of incidents in which violence has been incited in the name of Islam. In 1981 *Komando Jihad* hijacked the Woyla aircraft and subsequently was ambushed by the anti-terrorist unit of Kopassandha (former name of Indonesian elite force *Kopasus*). The Tanjung Priok incidents of September 1984, in which nine Chinese were killed by extremists and about 50 demonstrators were shot when they threatened to attack a police station. The bombing and arson campaign in protest against the 1985 laws restricting the use of religious affiliation and symbols for political mobilization. The latest incident, the Bali bombing in October 2002 resulting in more than two hundred dead and many more injured, and *Jemaah Islamiyah* is accused of being behind the action. Consequently, these incidents have increased the military awareness of the threat of Islam extremists and widen the gap between the military and the political Islam.

The friction between the military and Islamic political movements in politics can also be analyzed by the religious composition of the military elites. According to Rabasa, the number of non-Muslim officers, more particularly Christians (12 to 13 percent), shows disproportional composition to 8-10 percent of the Indonesian population at large. And even though Muslim officers still dominate the proportion of the military elites, there is only about 20 to 25 percent who represent *santri* or strict Muslims, and the rest are *abangan* or nominal Muslims7. The consequence of this disproportional composition is the military has been greatly influenced by the *abangan* perspective that had little sympathy for the goals of political Islam. The religious composition within the TNI led to the division of the officers’ corps into ‘green’ (Muslim) officers and ‘white and red’ (secularist-nationalist).

The assignment of General Moerdani as commander of the armed forces in 1985 can be seen as the victory of the ‘white and red’ fraction to block the Islamic influence within the military at that time. Moerdani brought Christian officers into important intelligence and command positions in numbers that were far out of proportion to their share of the military’s population. For instance, *Badan*

Intelejen Strategis (BAIS), or Strategic Intelligence Agency, was heavily staffed by Christian officers, the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an institution with a largely Christian staff, became an important private think tank for government’s policies.

There was also an indication of an attempt of the ‘green’ officers to bring Islamic influence into the corps, or at least to construct a close relationship between Islam and the military. Harold Crouch argued that at the time of the February-March 1995 personnel changes, the partnership of the armed forces Commander-in-Chief Feisal Tanjung and Army Chief of Staff General Hartono represented a significant move towards more cordial military-Islamic relations. Feisal Tanjung and Hartono were widely seen as Islamic military figures and had close relations with Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals organized by Habibie. As the result, from 1995 to 1999, no non-Muslim officer has risen to a four-star rank in any branch of service, nor has a non-Muslim held any of the most significant three-star post. An interesting event in 1999 showed an unfair competition among religions within the officers’ corps when Johny Lumintang was promoted to lieutenant general and assigned as commander of KOSTRAD by the president Habibie, Muslims general and the influential ICMI protested to assignment of a Christian to such an important position. Consequently, Lumintang was moved out, and replaced by a Muslim officer, Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago. However, the end of Habibie’s time in power in 1995 signaled the end of short time relation between the military and Islam, and the military went back to its basic position that is buffering political Islam from being dominant.

It can be seen here that the military also uses the religious factor as another reason to justify its intervention into politics. In this regard, Indonesian military has never stood far from the country’s politics since the 1945 Independence in order to prevent the political Islam dominating national politics, and also as a consequence of the domination of officer corps by the Javanese abangan Muslims.

2. Political Decision-Making Process

The concordance theory also analyzes interrelation among the three partners within the political decision-making process that determines important factors for the military. This involves the institutional organs of society that take a part in deciding military matters; structure, size, materials, and budget allocation. The process refers to the specific channels determining the needs and allocations of the military, and it is represented by parliaments, cabinets, special committees, political elites, and with or without the participation of military officers.

Formally, Indonesia has an elaborate structure and process for formulating national policy, of which defense and security considerations are only one aspect. According to the 1945 constitution, political decision-making structure for defense affairs can be described: the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces and is assisted by the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security (Menko Polkam), the Minister for Defense and Security (Menhankam), and the Commander-in-Chief TNI (Panglima TNI).

With an exception for student activists and a few number of pro-changes movements that always pose a challenge for some particular policies, there is virtually no institutional debates of defense policy, strategic concepts, force structure or budget allocations between civilian and military. The House of Representatives (DPR) Committee I for Foreign Affairs and Defense conducts annual hearings on the defense budget, but these are pro-forma appearances by Menhankam and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and their staffs. Although Lowry argues that traces of

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inter-service rivalry can be detected between the lines in the press\textsuperscript{11}, it is generally within the planning process only. This reflects that civilian’s determination not to be allowed to interfere in the military’s business, and very small chance for civilian to get involved in defense policy-making.

It is also important to notice that the military has influential power in parliament. Although the military and police representation was reduced from 75 to 38 and was scheduled to be phased out of the DPR and regional parliaments by 2004 as a consequence of the TNT’s ‘new reform’, the military still has the power to control the decision-taking process through the link between the TNI headquarters and the parliament and close relationship between military officers and the dominant parties’ leaders.

There is a strong indication of close relations between the winner party of the 1999 general election, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, and the military elites, although it is ironic because the PDI-P was a victim of military repression during the Suharto era. The tie has been made of the common nationalist outlook of the PDI-P and the military that they committed to preservation of the Indonesian nation unity. For instance, either agreed that there is no possibility for Aceh and Irian Jaya to be separated from the republic. There are several retired generals who have joined the PDI-P and the Megawati’s cabinet for particular important positions. Megawati appointed three retired military officers in her cabinet, Susilo Bambang Yndhoyono, Agum Gumelar, and Hari Sabarno, for positions as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, Minister of Transportation, and Minister for Internal Affairs, respectively. Although the position of Minister of Defense has been given to civilian officer, it is not significantly enough in representing civil supremacy because the three ministries held by the military are more crucially important. Another military officer who has longstanding close relations with Megawati is Hendropriyono. This retired lieutenant general was appointed by Megawati as director of the reorganized state agency, Badan Intelejen Nasional (BIN), and he was a key player in helping Megawati contain the security threats unleashed by the upsurge of Muslim militancy in response to the US war on terrorism.

The military support for Megawati, or more precisely the PDI-P, can be seen in the event of the Gus Dur’s fall in 2001 when the military played a crucial role in forcing Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) from his presidency and elevating Megawati as his successor. The military’s involvement in the 2001 succession crisis rejecting Gus Dur’s order to declare the emergency situation and to apply the martial law can be seen as violence to the constitution. The 1945 Constitution clearly states that the president is the supreme commander for the armed forces and the declaration of a state of emergency is absolutely on the president’s hand. Therefore, it can be argued that the military’s withdrawal of support for president that paved the way for Megawati to the presidential palace was obviously unconstitutional means. As further evidence of close ties between the president and the military, in September 2002, Megawati used her position as the General Chairwoman of the PDI-P interfering political-decision making in the regional house of representatives of Jakarta in order to elevate General Sutiyoso as the governor for the capital of Indonesia. Moreover, in May 2004, the military succeeded in persuading parliament and Megawati’s government for an unwilling President Wahid to use military forces in addressing separatist movement in Aceh, in which the martial law has been taken to secure order in the province and no less than 30,000 troops have been deployed against around 5,000 armed rebels. This was a contrast decision to PDI-P political issue of campaign when Megawati’s political speech before the presidential election in 1999 implicitly criticized the military operations conducted in Aceh.

An agreement between civilian and the military can also be found in addressing the military budget. As it noted earlier that although the House of Representatives conducts annual hearing for the military budget, civilians have never given any significant objection for the military’s proposal

on defense budget. This is based on the civilians’ realization that they have no choice because of the fact that the Indonesian central budget has never fully funded the military needs. It is estimated that only 25 to 30 percent of the military’s funding comes from the government budget, and the military must raise the rest on its own\textsuperscript{12}. This is always being the main reason for the military to get involved in economic sectors and to conduct several business activities.

The Indonesian military’s involvement in the economy has been happening since the early time of the independence struggle. Historically, during the Revolutionary War, the military were engaged in business to carry out economic guerrilla war against the Dutch. The aim was to seek funds needed to finance the war and revolution with regards that at the time civilian government has surrendered to the Dutch\textsuperscript{13}. The military’s participation in the economy increased sharply in 1957 when the Dutch enterprises were nationalized. Military personnel were placed in prominent positions in these enterprises, allowing the military to develop an economic network that it was able to generate income in the deteriorating economic climate of the later Sukarno years. The military’s economic role largely expanded again under the Suharto’s New Order when the military ran an extensive business structure including natural-resource extraction, finance, real estate, manufacturing, construction, etc.

Besides the official defense budget from government that only represents no more than one-third of the military’s overall income, there are three other funds sources that regarded as the military’s business ventures. First, the military runs business through the state enterprises. The most important of state companies for the military are Pertamina (\textit{Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara}), the state oil corporation, and Bulog (\textit{Badan Urusan Logistik}), the state agency for logistics that controls the distribution of rice and other commodities. There are also large state enterprises operating in the infrastructure (telecommunication and electricity) and banking sectors. In addition to military management or control of states enterprises, retired senior officers were routinely appointed as directors of both public and private firms\textsuperscript{14}.

Second, military cooperatives and foundations also contribute a significant proportion in providing the military’s funds. The military cooperatives run wholesale distribution business that provide affordable basic necessities and relieve operational and personnel costs not covered by the central budget. The structure of the cooperatives is hierarchical in every branch of service. The main level is at the TNI headquarters that also known as \textit{induk} (literally ‘mother’). At regional level, either Kodam and major Air Force or naval base maintains \textit{pusat} (centre) cooperatives, and at the Korem or unit level maintains \textit{primer} (primary) cooperatives. Funding for those cooperatives comes from two sources: member dues and holding companies\textsuperscript{15}. Military foundations are also known as \textit{yayasan}, in which most are subordinate to cooperatives. The TNI headquarters, army, navy, air force, all have their yayasan and even the Ministry of Defense has two of its own. The yayasan are chartered as charitable foundations exempt from taxation and also from the law that forbids active-duty military officers from being involved in business activities.

Third, there are a lot of non-institutional business activities conducted by retired and active-duty military personnel and their families outside of the official military business network. The military as an institution is not involved at this level, but individuals and groups of individuals are. This range of economic activities encompasses business operations in both the formal and the informal business.


The formal business is usually known as ‘facilitation’ where military officers charge a fee to help other businesses win contracts or get licensees to conduct particular activities. The military can also offer insurance against future disorder and uncertainty. Informal sector practices include hiring out military non-weapon equipments and vehicles, selling fuel and spare parts, and selling commodities from military cooperatives to local communities. It is important to note that the value of military business is greater in the informal sector than it is in the formal one.

Until the fall of the Suharto regime, the military’s involvement in the economy was always an untouchable issue for civilian’s intervention. With the onset of ‘reform’ in 1998, the rationale for the military’s involvement in business began to be questioned. Reformers, including from the military itself, recognized that even though military’s businesses provide jobs for both many civilians and military retirees and have solved the problem of the defense budget insufficiency, the system of military self-financing had also serious negative effects. The military’s involvement in business activities stands as a major obstacle to the democratization process of Indonesia in general, and more particularly the TNI’s evolution into a modern professional military force. Without complete control and transparency of the military budget, parliamentary control of the TNI will remain fragile. However, there is a wide recognition among civilian and the military that it would be difficult to withdraw the military from its economic activities without providing sufficient defense budget that satisfy the operational needs of the military. As the Minister of Defense Juwono noted that military withdrawal from economic cannot be done without economic recovery16.

Although Rebecca Schiff argues that the concordance theory allows the military’s involvement in economy as long as it acquires an agreement between the political elites, the military and the citizenry17, the military’s business links pose a threat of military intervention into civilian political spheres. The military’s involvement in economic activities has many serious problems that endanger the civilian supremacy. It fostered corruption and illegal activities, harmed readiness, created disparities in the compensation of officers with varying access to off-budget funding, eroded ethical standards, permitted unhealthy independence from government budgetary oversight and control, and produced commercial values inconsistent with military professionalism. Taking the concordance theory into Indonesian case of political decision-making process, it can be seen that cultural factors and the agreement of the three partners have failed to prevent domestic military intervention.

3. Recruitment Method

Recruitment can be defined as the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces. At this regard, Schiff borrows Finer’s method of military recruitment that there are two models: coercive and persuasive18. Coercive recruitment can be defined as forcible conscription that people give their time temporarily in military service as a citizenship obligation for the country. Persuasive recruitment implies a voluntary will of the citizenry to be in military service without a force from the government.

From the early time of Independence, military recruitment has never been a problem for Indonesia, neither for the senior officers’ level, non-commissioned officers’ nor for the enlisted soldiers’ level. Historically, Salim Said points out that the first form of Indonesian military was a self-created army where many young men (pemuda) and ex-Japanese-trained militias took the initiative themselves to create the defense army of the new-born Republic19. The pemuda first began seizing arms from Japanese soldiers and simultaneously started to organize themselves into many forms of

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19Salim Said. Loc.cit.
‘freedom fighters’ organization. This action was driven by the common realization of society of the need to establish armed forces in order to secure order and defend the Independence from any possible threat. Until the 1949 rationalization and restructurization of the armed forces, there was no formal model of recruitment conducted by the government. During the period of 1945-1949, many citizens participated in the Independence struggle and they could voluntarily join any armed organization, either the formal army under the central government or partisan militias (lasykar).

The trend of voluntary recruitment continues until today. Every year the military recruits hundreds of young men for senior, non-commissioned and enlisted officer positions, whereas there are thousands with at least the minimum level of education required who apply for those positions. For senior officer positions of all branches of service, the military academy that is conducted by the TNI’s headquarters recruits about 1000 new cadets every year with very competitive requirements such as having formal education at least secondary level with good scores in all subjects, physically and mentally fine, and having good behavior certificate from police. Meanwhile, several territorial institutions also conduct recruitment coordinated by the TNI’s headquarters for non-commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers.

The majority of the TNI’s most senior officers -of all branches of service- come from the military system. All cadets attend Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN) or the national military academy in Magelang for the first year. While army cadets remain in Magelang for three more years, navy and air force cadets move to the navy academy in Surabaya and the air force academy in Yogyakarta, respectively. The Indonesian military academy system does not grant an academic degree. Much of its curriculum, at all levels, is devoted to intense sociopolitical indoctrination and concentrates on instilling respect for discipline and cohort bonding through very tough and demanding physical training. Since 1995, there have been several programs planned to expand the academic curriculum to include granting of degrees, in cooperation with selected universities20.

There is variation of recruitment pattern for non-commissioned officers among branches of service. After selected by KODAM’s special committee of recruitment, the Army recruits undergo three months initial training with their KODAM training regiment. For special training such as artillery or armored vehicles training, recruits should attend centralized corps schools, many of which are located around Bandung. Meanwhile, the Navy trains its non-commissioned officers centralized in Surabaya. The Air Force has similar pattern of training to the navy, but located in Yogyakarta.

Although Schiff argues that this model of voluntary recruitment is based on ‘beliefs’ that the sacrifice of military service is worthwhile for the sake of security, patriotism, or nationalism21, with the exception of the period of the Independence struggle 1945-1949, the Indonesian voluntary model of military recruitment seems still far for taking such idealistic reasons into account. Otherwise, rationality plays an important role for explaining why people ‘willingly offer themselves’ for the need of enlistment into the Indonesia armed forces. There are two main reasons for Indonesian voluntary model of recruitment. First, there is common perception in Indonesian middle class society particularly in rural areas that a military personnel deserves a higher status than ordinary people. The family status would be increase and family members would be proud if at least one of their relatives becomes a soldier whatever the rank he gains. This perspective is based on belief that one with arm represents power to obtain or defend his (family) interests. Moreover, as the result of the TNI’s dwi fungsi a military career is frequently considered as the best way to reach the top level of power and wealth in society. In general, we may draw an assumption that the military possesses many advantages over other groups in Indonesian society as the consequence of the historical success of the military in defending independence during the revolution and in suppressing several rebellions

throughout the country.

Second, Indonesia suffers a high level of unemployment and underemployment, and therefore the military is seen as one of the institutions that provide jobs for those people. While it is estimated about 13 million people who unemployed today, every year the military regularly recruits thousands for cadets, non-commissioned and enlisted officers. Since 1995 the Army also accepts tertiary graduates with first degrees or diplomas for staff and command officers. The Air Force and the Navy also recruit officers on short-term enlistment for specialist jobs such as doctors and engineering\(^\text{22}\). Although the tertiary graduates and specialist jobs recruitment are only conducted periodically, usually once for three years depending on the need of particular positions, they are significant along with regular recruitment in absorbing number of unemployment in Indonesia.

While Indonesian government does not need to coerce its people into military service due to those two reasons, it can be seen that historical and cultural factors are critical in understanding the voluntary model of Indonesian military recruitment. However, in contrast to Schiff’s argument that persuasive recruitment can allow concordance between the military and civilian in order to prevent domestic military intervention\(^\text{23}\), the voluntary model of military recruitment in Indonesia that has been driven by historical and cultural factors has failed in explaining the longstanding military intervention into politics.

4. Military Style

According to Schiff, military style refers to the appearance of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it\(^\text{24}\). Taking the Schiff’s model explaining interrelation between cultural factors and military style, this section explores the elements of Indonesian military style, such as what the Indonesian military looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it.

The uniform has always been one significant symbol in describing what the military looks like. The Indonesian military uniform of the three branches of service were distinguished by color and style, with variations in headgears and other details distinguishing some elite troops, who wear various colors of berets. The Army working and ceremonial uniforms are olive drab, while the Air force and the Navy uniforms are medium blue and navy blue, respectively. In ceremonial and service dress, senior officers wear their rank insignia on the shoulder epaulet while the non-commissioned wear them on the sleeves.

However, the Indonesian military style, in general, is frequently seen and known by the society with its field uniform. Most of the Indonesian military units and groups wear the tiger’s striped camouflage as their field uniforms. With the exception of the Kopassus (the Army’s elite forces) who wears red and brown color for their tiger’s striped camouflage uniform, the field uniform for all units consist black and green colors. Unit’s symbol on sleeves signifies soldier’s unit or brigade, but the color of the beret is much understandable for society to identify the soldier’s group or corps he belongs to. For example, the kopassus (army) is recognised as ‘the red beret corps’, the green berets for the KOSTRAD (army) and the airborne battalions (army), the brown berets for the artillery units (army), the black berets for armored vehicles/cavalry battalions (army), the yellow berets for the kopaskhas (the Air Force Special Force Command), and the violet berets for the Marine corps (navy).

There is an assumption that the military wants the stigma of the military’s term of ‘professionalism’ to be constructed within the society. The term of ‘professionalism’ here is very


\(^{24}\) Ibid.
different from the Huntington’s concept of military’s professionalism, rather it refers to particular ability and effectiveness in governing and maintaining the unity of the nation. In this regard, the military style represents the advantage of military’s professionalism over its civilian counterpart. The assumption of military ‘professionalism’ is based on historical experience of military disappointment of the civilian’s ‘incompetence’ in governing the country. As it noted before that during the Revolution, the military has successfully saved the republic through guerrilla warfare when Sudirman rejected to follow Sukarno’s surrender to the Dutch in 1948. In addition, the military also showed its capability in suppressing many separatist movements throughout the country during the Sukarno’s era.

Although the military’s professionalism is still questioned in many cases regarding the lack of discipline and morale, the assumption that the military is more professional than its civilian counterpart has in general been accepted by the society. In many occasions, the military style (or half-military style) including military’s structure, tradition ad symbol, manifests within civilian’s practical life. For example, government officers from central to local institutions are required to practice the military model of short ceremony that called as apel in the morning and afternoon before returning home from Tuesday to Friday, and the flag rising ceremony on every Monday morning. The similar practice has been applied to students up to high senior level in order to increase their nationalism. In many government’s service and institutions, there is a green military-like uniform wore by civilian officers on particular days, usually on Thursday. This military replicated uniform is well known as Hansip (Pertahanan Sipil) or Civil Defence uniform. According to Schiller, the civilian adoption of the military style that has a significant effect in political culture is in the APDN (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) or the Academy of Home Affairs in Jatinangor near Bandung, a most prominent education institution for civil service officers. This civilian education institution replicates the model of Akmil (Akademi Militer), the Military Academy including its uniform, structure and tradition. Like in the Military Academy, the APDN students are also called as Taruna that means cadets, and they may be misinterpreted easily as military cadets regarding their military-like uniforms. The curriculum is much similar to it is used in the Military Academy, includes nationalism and sociopolitical indoctrination, respect for discipline, and even official marching and basic training of arms use. Consequently, the graduates of the APDN who most of them became prominent leaders in governmental institutions apply the military or half-military style in their work environments and require this style to their employees.

The civilian adoption of the military style, symbolized by the uniform and tradition, represents a successful effort of the military in stigmatizing the civilian with the claim that military is integrated part of the society. As Indonesian military officers always state in many occasions that there is no boundary between the military and the society by using slogan ‘Risen from the people, Owned by the people, A part of the people’. Despite the civilian acceptance of good values in military’s professionalism such as effectiveness, coordination, and uniformity, the military style poses negative effects into the society. It can be argued that the civilian adoption of military style has directly or indirectly paved the way for the military to interfere civilian’s affairs including its political spheres. Moreover, it has also contaminated the civilian culture with values and tradition that may be inappropriate for a democratic society such as centralization model and the culture of violence. In this regards, Liem Soei Liong argues that the Indonesian military has played a significant role in cultivating the seeds of violence.

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in the civilian culture resulting in continuous communal conflict among the groups of society in Indonesia, where the military frequently gets involved as a key player (Liong, 2002). At this point we may draw an assumption that the military style does not always achieve the agreement of the idea of civilian supremacy, but it sometimes appears in encouraging domestic military intervention. As the previous three indicators of concordance, the military style is another factor that has significant influence on the existence of domestic military intervention in Indonesia.

2. CONCLUSIONS

It is true that historical and cultural factors have played important roles in shaping civil-military relations in Indonesia. However, they fail to construct the authority of the civil sphere over the military as the main objective of the most civil-military relations theories. In many aspects of concordance, the Indonesian military even uses the specific historical and cultural conditions of the nation to develop and justify its political role.

The study found that in the case of Indonesia, Rebecca Schiff’s theory of concordance has failed to provide the links between the agreement among the three partners (military, political elites, and society) and the civilian supremacy over the military. Historical and cultural factors as Schiff suggests as elements to encourage the absence of military intervention in politics, have been direct and indirect driving force for the occurrence of the Indonesian military socio-political roles.

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