

Digital Governance and Online Political Control: A Cross-National Analysis Using the Digital Society Dataset in Indonesia and Nigeria

Siti Nurhaliza Febryna Khaidir¹, Desmond Onyemechi Okocha², Balqis Khaidir³

¹Master Program of Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia

²Department of Mass Communication, Bingham University, Nigeria

³Department of Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia

Abstract

The expansion of digital governance raises urgent concerns about the relationship between state technological capacity and the protection of digital civil rights, particularly in emerging democracies. This study offers a novel comparative examination of Indonesia and Nigeria, investigating how government cyber capacity relates to three dimensions of online political control: social media monitoring, censorship, and arrests for political content. Drawing on country-year data from the Digital Society Project (DSP) v7 covering 2010–2024, the study employs descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression. The findings reveal that Nigeria exhibits more intensive online political control than Indonesia, as reflected in its lower DSP scores across all three indicators. Regression analysis identifies a significant positive association between government cyber capacity and social media monitoring scores ($\beta = 0.45$, $p < 0.05$), indicating less restrictive monitoring under DSP coding. These findings challenge assumptions that stronger digital state capacity necessarily intensifies political surveillance. The study contributes to comparative digital governance scholarship by demonstrating the conceptual distinction between technological capacity and political control, while highlighting the importance of rights-based governance frameworks that reconcile digital transformation with freedom of expression, privacy, and democratic accountability.

Keywords: Digital governance, online political control, internet censorship, social media surveillance, Digital Society Project.

INTRODUCTION

Digital transformation has become a key driver of change in modern governance. Governments in various countries are adopting digital platforms to improve bureaucratic efficiency, transparency, and public participation. In Indonesia, e-government programs such as Satu Data Indonesia and SP4N-LAPOR! have been developed to expand access to public information and facilitate citizen feedback. Nigeria has likewise pursued the digitization

of public services as part of wider efforts to improve administrative efficiency and accountability (Ishola et al., 2025). Across the African context, digital space has also become an important arena for civic engagement and public participation, illustrating that digital governance can strengthen the relationship between citizens and public institutions when access and accountability are protected (Okocha & Akpe, 2024).

A number of studies indicate that effectively managed digital transformation can contribute to increased public trust and political participation. In South Sulawesi, digital reform was found to be associated with increased public trust in government, suggesting that the quality of digital government implementation can influence citizens' perceptions of public institutions (Nurlinah et al., 2025). At the same time, digital technologies can expand the capacity for surveillance, censorship, and other forms of online political control. This duality is particularly relevant in developing democracies, where digital participation and digital restriction may coexist (Okocha & Akpe, 2024; Udoh et al., 2024). The Digital Society Project (DSP) provides cross-national time-series indicators on online censorship, politicization of social media, coordinated information operations, foreign influence, and government cyber capabilities. The dataset was designed to address the lack of comparable cross-national measures of digital political dynamics (Mechkova et al., 2025).

Indonesia and Nigeria were selected as comparative cases because both are major electoral systems in Southeast Asia and West Africa that have experienced substantial expansion of the digital sphere over the past decade. In Indonesia, wider digital access has occurred alongside concerns about restrictions on freedom of expression through legal instruments, digital surveillance, and online opinion manipulation. The use of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (ITE Law), legal actions against internet users, and the role of pro-government online commentators have contributed to concerns about the narrowing of digital civic space (Pratamawaty, 2025).

Digital transformation in Indonesia also presents broader challenges related to cybersecurity and data protection. While the

expansion of digital services can improve efficiency and accessibility, it can simultaneously increase risks related to data misuse, privacy, and security vulnerabilities. Government digitization therefore requires adaptive policies that balance technological innovation, cybersecurity, and the protection of citizens' digital rights (Hafel, 2023).

Nigeria shows a similarly complex relationship between digital participation and state regulation. Following the #EndSARS protests in 2020 and the suspension of Twitter in 2021, the government strengthened its regulatory approach to digital platforms. Recent Nigerian scholarship documents a range of control mechanisms, including legal restrictions, monitoring, censorship, platform suspension, and pressure on journalists and online critics (Okocha et al., 2023; Obia, 2025; Obiora et al., 2025).

At the same time, Nigerian digital platforms have become important channels for civic engagement, youth mobilization, and social criticism. Studies of #EndSARS and other forms of online political participation show that social media can expand citizens' capacity to mobilize, communicate grievances, and participate in public debate, while state responses may include intimidation, restrictive regulation, or platform controls (Okocha & Chigbo, 2024; Udoh et al., 2024). This tension makes Nigeria a useful comparison for examining how digital governance capacity can coexist with both participatory opportunities and stronger state oversight.

Although descriptive case studies of digital politics are increasingly available, quantitative cross-national comparisons of digital governance capacity and online political control remain relatively limited. Using DSP data for Indonesia and Nigeria, this study aims to: (1) compare patterns of government social media monitoring,

content censorship, and arrests for political content; (2) assess whether Government Cyber Capacity, GDP per capita, Polyarchy, and Internet Penetration are associated with these indicators of online political control; and (3) interpret the statistical findings in relation to recent literature from Indonesia, Nigeria, and the wider African context. The study thereby contributes to understanding how digital modernization may coexist with different forms of political regulation and digital freedom.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses the Digital Society Project (DSP) Version 7 dataset as its primary source of digital political indicators (Mechkova et al., 2025). DSP v7 provides annual country-level values from 2000 to 2024. The analysis focuses on Indonesia (IDN) and Nigeria (NGA) over the 2010-2024 period. The main DSP variables are Government Social Media Monitoring (v2smgovsmmon), Government Social Media Censorship in Practice (v2smgovsmcenprc), Arrests for Political Content (v2smarrest), and Government Cyber Capacity (v2smgovcapsec). For the first three variables, higher scores indicate less restrictive conditions - less monitoring, less censorship, and fewer arrests - whereas higher Government Cyber Capacity scores indicate greater state technical and institutional capacity. GDP per capita and Internet Penetration are included as control variables using the macroeconomic and connectivity measures employed in the analytic dataset, with World Development Indicators serving as the reference source for these concepts (World Bank, 2025). The V-Dem Polyarchy Index is used as the measure of electoral democracy.

The DSP v7 CSV file and codebook were used to identify the annual country-year estimates and variable definitions. Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS 28 and Python (pandas and statsmodels). The analytical procedure included: (1) descriptive statistics for the principal variables in both countries; (2) descriptive comparison of key digital indicators; (3) multiple linear regression (OLS), with Government Social Media Monitoring, Social Media Censorship, and Arrests for Political Content treated as dependent variables and Government Cyber Capacity, GDP per capita, Polyarchy, and Internet Penetration as predictors; and (4) sensitivity checks using alternative specifications, including country effects and lagged predictors. All statistical tests used a 95% confidence level, and diagnostic checks included residual assessment and multicollinearity testing.

The research sample consists of country-year observations for Indonesia and Nigeria from 2010 through 2024, yielding a maximum of 30 observations before any model-specific exclusions for missing data. The period was selected to capture recent developments in digital governance and online political regulation in both countries. Where isolated annual values were unavailable, the analysis followed the handling procedure described in the working dataset; model estimates were based on the observations available for the relevant specification. Table 1 summarizes the operational definitions, coding direction, and measurement scales used in the study.

Table 1. Operational Definitions and Measurement of Study Variables

No.	Variable	Code/Indicator	Scale	Operational Definition
1	Government Social Media Monitoring	DSP v2smgovsmmon	Ordinal 1–5	Measures the extent to which the government monitors political content circulating online. A score of 5 indicates the lowest level of government surveillance.
2	Government Social Media Censorship	DSP v2smgovsmcenprc	Ordinal 1–5	Measures the extent of government actions to censor, restrict, or block content on social media. A score of 5 indicates the least amount of censorship.
3	Arrests for Political Content	DSP v2sमारrest	Ordinal 1–5	Describes the likelihood that an individual will be arrested or face legal action by authorities for publishing critical or anti-government political content. A score of 5 indicates that arrests are rare.
4	Government Cyber Capacity	DSP v2smgovcapsec	Ordinal 1–5	Measures the government’s technical, institutional, and resource capacity to carry out activities in the cyber domain. A score of 5 indicates high cyber capacity.
5	Internet Penetration	World Bank/DSP	Percentage (%)	Measures the proportion of the population that uses or has access to the Internet compared to the total population.
6	GDP per Capita	World Bank (WDI)	USD per capita	Measures the average economic income per person. In the analysis, this can be expressed in thousands of USD to facilitate interpretation.
7	Polyarchy	V-Dem Polyarchy Index (v2x_polyarchy)	Index 0–1	Measures the level of electoral democracy, including political freedom, electoral competition, political participation, and the quality of general elections. A higher score indicates a stronger level of democracy.

Source: Authors' compilation based on the DSP v7 Codebook, V-Dem, and World Bank indicators, 2026.

The empirical expectation is that greater government cyber capacity may be associated with stricter online political control. Because the DSP monitoring, censorship, and arrest


indicators are coded so that higher values represent less restrictive conditions, this hypothesis corresponds to a negative association between Government Cyber Capacity and those outcome scores. Polyarchy, GDP per capita, and Internet

Penetration are included as controls that may condition the relationship between digital capacity and online political control

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The analysis reveals distinct but related patterns of digital governance and political control in Indonesia and Nigeria. Using the operational definitions in Table 1, the descriptive comparison for 2010-2024 shows meaningful differences in government monitoring, content censorship, and the risk of arrest for online political expression. In the DSP coding, higher scores on these three indicators represent less restrictive conditions. Figures 1 and 2 therefore should be read as comparisons of the intensity of government control rather than as simple measures of technological capacity.

Figure 1. Comparison of Government Social Media Monitoring and Censorship between Indonesia and Nigeria




Source: Authors' processing based on DSP v7, 2026.

On Government Social Media Monitoring (GovtMonitor), Indonesia records an average score of approximately 3.35, compared with about 1.75 for Nigeria. Because higher scores indicate less monitoring, the lower Nigerian score is consistent with more intensive state surveillance of online political activity. This pattern is consistent with qualitative research on Nigeria that identifies monitoring, legal controls, censorship, and platform restrictions as recurring instruments of digital control

(Okocha et al., 2023). It also aligns with research showing that African governments may respond forcefully when digital platforms are used for civic mobilization and criticism (Okocha & Chigbo, 2024).


Figure 2. Comparison of Digital Content Censorship between Indonesia and Nigeria



Source: Authors' processing based on DSP v7, 2026.

A similar difference appears in Government Social Media Censorship in Practice (GovtCensor). Indonesia has an average score of approximately 3.05, compared with about 1.55 for Nigeria. Under the DSP coding, Nigeria's lower score indicates more intensive censorship. Such controls may include website or platform restrictions, state-mandated content removal, legal pressure, and other mechanisms that constrain information flows. This result is consistent with Okocha et al. (2023), who identify censorship, regulatory restrictions, internet controls, and intimidation as elements of digital authoritarianism in Nigeria, and with Udoh et al. (2024), who report that digital participation in Nigeria can coexist with hostile or restrictive government responses to online social criticism.

Figure 3. Comparison of Selected Digital Governance Indicators: Indonesia and Nigeria



Source: Authors' processing based on DSP v7, 2026.

The risk of arrest for political content shows another marked difference. Nigeria has an average score of approximately 1.65, compared with 3.21 for Indonesia. Because a lower DSP score indicates a greater likelihood of arrest or legal sanction for online political expression, the descriptive evidence suggests a higher risk of punitive state action in Nigeria. This interpretation is consistent with recent research documenting arrests, legal pressure, and other coercive measures affecting journalists, critics, and digital media practitioners in Nigeria (Okocha et al., 2023). Freedom House likewise reports continuing legal pressure and arrests related to online activity in Nigeria (Freedom House, 2024b).

The two countries are closer in Government Cyber Capacity. Indonesia records a score of approximately 3.90, while Nigeria records approximately 3.45. This indicator reflects a government's technical, institutional, and resource capacity to address cybersecurity and operate in the digital domain. The relatively small difference suggests that Indonesia and Nigeria possess more comparable levels of cyber capacity than their scores on monitoring, censorship, and arrests would imply.

Internet penetration shows a different pattern. In early 2024, internet penetration was approximately 66.5% of the total population in Indonesia and 45.5% in Nigeria

(Kemp, 2024a, 2024b). The difference of about 21 percentage points is substantial rather than marginal, indicating that Indonesia had considerably broader internet access at that time. This distinction is important because digital participation depends not only on political and regulatory conditions but also on the population's ability to access online spaces.

Taken together, the descriptive findings indicate that Indonesia and Nigeria are relatively close in cyber capacity but differ more clearly in internet penetration and in the DSP indicators of online political control. Indonesia records higher scores on government monitoring, censorship, and arrests, which correspond to less restrictive conditions under the DSP coding. Nigeria, by contrast, records lower scores on these measures, indicating more intensive state control over online political activity.

These findings reinforce the broader argument that technological capacity and digital freedom should not be treated as equivalent. Countries with broadly comparable cyber capabilities can still differ substantially in how governments regulate political communication, while differences in internet access can shape the size and composition of the online public sphere. Research on African media and democracy similarly emphasizes that digital and social media can widen participation while operating within political environments that vary in the degree of legal and institutional repression (Okocha & Dapoet, 2024).

Digital Transformation and the Dynamics of Democracy in Indonesia and Nigeria

The results also show why cyber capacity should be analytically separated from the quality of democracy. In the DSP framework, Government Cyber Capacity measures whether the state has sufficient personnel, expertise, and resources to address cyber threats; it does not directly measure political

freedom, accountability, or democratic openness. This distinction is consistent with recent African scholarship showing that digital technologies can strengthen participation and public-service capacity while simultaneously creating opportunities for regulation, surveillance, or state pushback (Okocha & Akpe, 2024).

Within this framework, Indonesia can be understood as having relatively strong digital governance capacity without assuming that technological capacity is synonymous with democratic consolidation. The study therefore uses the V-Dem Polyarchy Index (v2x_polyarchy), measured from 0 to 1, as a distinct indicator of electoral democracy. Polyarchy captures elements such as broad suffrage, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and freedom of association (Baized et. al, 2025). Treating Polyarchy and cyber capacity as separate variables prevents technological modernization from being used as a proxy for democratic quality.

The distinction is also visible in recent regime classifications. The V-Dem Democracy Report 2025 places Indonesia among grey-zone electoral autocracies and Nigeria among grey-zone electoral democracies, emphasizing the uncertainty around cases located close to the boundary between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy (Nord et al., 2025). These classifications should be interpreted as V-Dem's measurement-based categories rather than as direct measures of digital governance. Their relevance here is that growth in technological capacity does not necessarily move in the same direction as changes in democratic institutions.

From an analytical perspective, the relationship between digital transformation and democracy is therefore not necessarily linear. Technological capacity can improve public services, information access, and citizen participation, but it can also coexist with weakened civil liberties or stronger state regulation of political communication.

Nigerian research illustrates this duality: digitalization has expanded the reach of social criticism and civic mobilization, while participants in recent studies also describe intimidation, restrictions, and adverse government responses to online criticism (Udoh et al., 2024). This reinforces the need to evaluate digital transformation together with institutional safeguards for political rights and accountability.

Figure 4. Understanding the Relationship Between Digital Capacity and Democracy

Understanding the Relationship Between Digital and Democracy



Source: Developed by the authors, 2026.

Government cyber capacity and democratic quality should therefore be treated as distinct but interrelated dimensions. Cyber capacity concerns a state's ability to manage digital risks and maintain technical infrastructure, whereas democratic quality concerns political rights, electoral competition, civil liberties, and accountability. In both Indonesia and Nigeria, the relevant question is not simply whether digital capacity is increasing, but how that capacity is governed and whether digital institutions expand citizen participation, public transparency, and rights protection (Okocha & Akpe, 2024).

Substantively, the findings reinforce the argument that democracy in the digital age cannot be assessed solely from technological infrastructure or cyber capability. A more informative assessment links digital capacity

to governance practices and the conditions under which political communication occurs. The Indonesia-Nigeria comparison shows that digital modernization can coexist with different patterns of democratic development and online control; the relationship must therefore be interpreted contextually rather than assumed to be uniformly positive or negative.

Online Political Surveillance, Risks of Repression, and Variations in Digital Control Regimes

Nigeria records lower DSP scores than Indonesia on government monitoring, censorship, and arrests for political content. Within the DSP measurement framework, these lower values represent more intensive monitoring, stronger censorship, and a greater likelihood of arrest. The descriptive comparison therefore supports the conclusion that Nigeria exhibits stricter state control on these specific dimensions. This interpretation concerns the measured DSP indicators and should not be treated as a general ranking of every aspect of digital democracy.

The Nigerian pattern is consistent with recent literature on digital regulation and state control. Research documents the 2021 Twitter suspension, legal and administrative restrictions, monitoring, censorship, and pressure on online journalists and critics as important features of Nigeria's digital political environment (Okocha et al., 2023; Obiora et al., 2025; Vesteinsson, 2021). Okocha and Chigbo (2024) similarly show that social media has become a major channel for youth political mobilization in Nigeria, while government responses to such mobilization have included restrictions and attempts to control online activism. These studies provide contextual support for the lower Nigerian DSP scores on monitoring and censorship.

Indonesia, however, should not be interpreted as an unrestricted digital environment. Freedom House's Freedom on

the Net 2024 reports classify both Indonesia and Nigeria as 'Partly Free,' with scores of 49 and 59, respectively; because the Freedom House scale runs from 0 (least free) to 100 (most free), these scores do not support a simple conclusion that Indonesia is uniformly freer online than Nigeria (Freedom House, 2024a, 2024b). In Indonesia, concerns remain about criminal prosecution, harassment, content restrictions, and the use of legal provisions affecting online expression. Accordingly, the DSP country comparison is best understood as evidence about specific forms of monitoring, censorship, and arrest rather than as a complete index of internet freedom.

A cautious comparative interpretation is therefore necessary. Nigeria displays more intensive control on the specific DSP indicators examined here, while Indonesia shows a different configuration of legal, administrative, and political pressures on digital expression. Research on African media and political systems likewise emphasizes that media freedom and political participation vary across regime types and institutional settings, making context essential when interpreting digital-control indicators (Okocha & Dapoet, 2024).

In Indonesia, state intervention in the digital sphere has more often been discussed in relation to legal and administrative restrictions, prosecution of online expression, and the management of online information rather than a prolonged nationwide platform suspension. Recent scholarship describes concerns about digital authoritarian drift, legal pressure, and online manipulation (Pratamawaty, 2025), while Freedom House (2024a) documents continuing restrictions and user-rights violations. These forms of control are institutionally different from the Nigerian Twitter suspension but remain relevant to comparative analysis of online political regulation.

Overall, the descriptive findings agree with the recent literature in showing that online political control can take multiple forms. Nigeria's lower DSP scores correspond with literature documenting overt platform restrictions, surveillance, censorship, and coercive pressure, whereas Indonesian scholarship emphasizes legal regulation, online manipulation, and episodic restrictions. The comparison therefore suggests variation in the mechanisms and intensity of digital control rather than a simple binary distinction between a free and an unfree digital system.

OLS Regression Analysis: The multiple linear regression analysis uses a maximum of 30 country-year observations. For Government Social Media Monitoring, the reported coefficient for Government Cyber Capacity is positive and statistically significant ($\beta = 0.45$, $p < 0.05$). Under the original DSP coding, however, higher monitoring scores mean less intensive surveillance. The positive coefficient should therefore be interpreted as an association between greater cyber capacity and a less restrictive monitoring score, not as evidence that cyber capacity increases surveillance. Polyarchy is also positively associated with the monitoring score ($\beta = 0.50$, $p < 0.01$), which is consistent with less restrictive monitoring at higher levels of electoral democracy. GDP per capita and Internet Penetration are reported as statistically non-significant. The same coding principle must be applied when interpreting coefficients for the censorship and arrest outcomes.

The regression findings should be interpreted with caution given the study's limited geographical coverage and relatively short observation period. The analysis includes only two countries over 15 years (2010–2024), potentially limiting the statistical power and generalizability of the estimates. Furthermore, the observational research design does not establish causal relationships between government cyber

capacity and online political control. The reported coefficients should therefore be understood as conditional statistical associations rather than causal effects. Future research should incorporate a broader country sample, longer observation periods, and alternative model specifications to assess the robustness and external validity of these findings.

The Indonesian results are consistent with literature describing digital transformation as a process that combines administrative modernization with continuing concerns about cybersecurity, privacy, and citizen rights. Hafel (2023) emphasizes the opportunities and governance challenges associated with Indonesia's digital transformation, while Nurlinah et al. (2025) show that the quality of digital government implementation can be related to public trust and participation. The present findings add to this literature by separating cyber capacity from the specific DSP indicators of political monitoring and control.

Nigeria presents a different configuration. Digital capacity has developed alongside stronger regulation of platforms and documented practices of surveillance, censorship, and pressure on critics. This pattern is consistent with studies of Nigeria's platform regulation and digital authoritarianism (Obia, 2025; Okocha et al., 2023), as well as research showing that digital social criticism can generate adverse or restrictive responses from government (Udoh et al., 2024). At the same time, social media remains an important resource for youth mobilization and political participation (Okocha & Chigbo, 2024), demonstrating that control and participation can coexist within the same digital environment.

Overall, the comparison shows that digital transformation is not synonymous with either expanded freedom or expanded repression. Digital technologies can support participation, public-service delivery, and accountability,

while also increasing the state's technical capacity to regulate online activity. Research on civic engagement in African digital spaces highlights the participatory potential of these technologies (Okocha & Akpe, 2024), while studies of misinformation and political communication show that online environments also create governance challenges that can motivate regulatory responses (Okocha & Okerefor, 2024). Effective digital governance therefore requires both institutional capacity and safeguards for freedom of expression, privacy, access to information, and due process.

CONCLUSION

This cross-country study compares digital governance capacity and online political control in Indonesia and Nigeria using DSP v7 indicators. The descriptive findings show that Nigeria records lower scores on government social media monitoring, censorship, and arrests for political content, which under the DSP coding indicates more intensive control on these specific dimensions. Indonesia and Nigeria are closer in Government Cyber Capacity, while Indonesia had substantially higher internet penetration in early 2024. The OLS model reports a significant positive association between Government Cyber Capacity and the monitoring score; because higher monitoring scores indicate less surveillance, this result does not support the hypothesis that greater cyber capacity necessarily intensifies monitoring under the original DSP coding.

The study contributes to the literature by showing that digital capacity, democratic quality, and online political control should be treated as related but distinct dimensions. Digital technologies can strengthen public participation and administrative effectiveness, yet their political consequences depend on the legal and institutional context in which they are deployed. Policy efforts

should therefore combine investment in digital infrastructure and literacy with clear safeguards for privacy, freedom of expression, access to information, and accountable use of state cyber capabilities.

Future research should expand the number of countries and observations, report complete model coefficients and uncertainty measures for all outcomes, and test alternative specifications using larger panel datasets. Studies that construct a repression-oriented index should explicitly reverse-code the relevant DSP variables so that coefficient direction is unambiguous. Qualitative research could also complement the statistical analysis by examining how laws, platform regulation, and enforcement practices produce different forms of online political control in Indonesia, Nigeria, and comparable democracies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baized, M. N. H., Rahman, A., & Ferdous, J. (2025). Election in Bangladesh: Challenges to conduct free and fair election. *Journal of Contemporary Local Politics*, 4(1), 107-116. <https://doi.org/10.46507/jclp.v4i1.699>
- Freedom House. (2024a). Indonesia: Freedom on the Net 2024 country report. Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-net/2024>
- Freedom House. (2024b). Nigeria: Freedom on the Net 2024 country report. Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-net/2024>
- Hafel, M. (2023). Digital transformation in politics and governance in Indonesia: Opportunities and challenges in the era of technological disruption. *Society*, 11(2), 742-757. <https://doi.org/10.33019/society.v11i2.577>

- Ishola, A. A., Maramura, T. C., & Gumbo, T. (2025). Charting digital governance: A bibliometric analysis of information and communication technology research in Nigeria's public administration using Scopus. *Frontiers in Sustainable Cities*, 7. <https://doi.org/10.3389/frsc.2025.1605736>
- Kemp, S. (2024a). Digital 2024: Indonesia. DataReportal. <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-indonesia>
- Kemp, S. (2024b). Digital 2024: Nigeria. DataReportal. <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-nigeria>
- Mechkova, V., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., & Wilson, S. L. (2025). Measuring online political activity: Introducing the Digital Society Project dataset. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 22(3), 279-295. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2024.2350495>
- Nord, M., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Fernandes, T., Good God, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2025). Democracy Report 2025: 25 years of autocratization - Democracy trumped? V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/61/v-dem-dr__2025_lowres_v2.pdf
- Nurlinah, Ansar, M. C., & Chowdhury, K. (2025). Impact of government digital transformation on citizen trust and participation: Evidence from Gowa Regency, Indonesia. *Frontiers in Human Dynamics*, 7. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2025.1700582>
- Obia, V. (2025). Digital policy and Nigeria's Platform Code of Practice: Toward a radical co-regulatory shift. *Data & Policy*, 7, e12. <https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2025.1>
- Obiora, C. A., Chiamogu, A. P., & Chiamogu, U. P. (2025). Social media regulation and autocratization in Nigeria under Buhari. *African Journal of Political Science*, 13(1), 38-50. <https://doi.org/10.36615/szd2s675>
- Okocha, D. O., & Akpe, S. M. (2024). Civic engagement, public participation, and trust in digital space: The emerging new face of democracy in Africa. In I. Mhute & E. Mavengano (Eds.), *Political Communication in Sub-Saharan Africa, Volume I: Media and Democracy* (pp. 15-36). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48431-5_2
- Okocha, D. O., & Chigbo, M. (2024). Social media landscape in Africa: Mobilising and engineering youths for socio-political change in Sub-Saharan Africa. In J. A. Al-Obaidi (Ed.), *Changing Global Media Landscapes: Convergence, Fragmentation, and Polarization* (pp. 179-198). IGI Global Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-3767-7.ch010>
- Okocha, D. O., & Dapoet, B. A. (2024). Mass media and politics in Africa: A qualitative appraisal. In I. Mhute & E. Mavengano (Eds.), *Political Communication in Sub-Saharan Africa, Volume I: Media and Democracy* (pp. 37-66). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48431-5_3
- Okocha, D. O., Chigbo, M., & Onobe, M. J. (2023). Digital authoritarianism in postcolonial Nigeria: Internet control techniques and censorship. In E. Mavengano & I. Mhute (Eds.), *Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II: Across National Contexts* (pp. 229-249). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_12

- Okocha, D. O., & Okereafor, S. C. (2024). Fake news in Nigerian politics: Breakneck of Nigerian democracy. In I. Mhute & E. Mavengano (Eds.), *Political Communication in Sub-Saharan Africa, Volume II: Governance and Language Policy* (pp. 251-273). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44320-6_13
- Pratamawaty, B. B. (2025). Social media activism and digital authoritarian drift in flawed democracies: The case of Indonesia. *Dialogues on Digital Society*, 1(3), 469-473. <https://doi.org/10.1177/29768640251383985>
- Udoh, W. B., Echoi, M. P., & Okocha, D. O. (2024). Critical analysis of digitalisation and social criticism as a new frontier for participatory democracy in Nigeria. *Social & Digital Media Discourse*, 5(1), 52-65.
- Vesteinsson, K. (2021). Nigeria's Twitter ban is a bellwether case for internet freedom. Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/article/nigerias-twitter-ban-bellwether-case-internet-freedom>
- World Bank. (2025). World Development Indicators. World Bank Data. <https://data.worldbank.org/>