Bank Indonesia and the Evolution of Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking: A Comparative Perspective

Abstract

The constitutional status of central banks raises a fundamental tension between monetary-policy 
independence and democratic accountability, particularly in emerging constitutional democracies 
undergoing institutional reform. This article examines how Indonesia’s constitutional and statutory 
framework structures the independence and accountability of Bank Indonesia and compares its 
institutional design with the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve System, and the Bank of 
England. Using doctrinal legal research and a functional comparative constitutional approach, the 
analysis focuses on constitutional entrenchment, statutory delegation, and accountability mechanisms. 
It examines Article 23D of the 1945 Constitution, the Bank Indonesia Law, the financial-sector reforms 
introduced by Law No. 4 of 2023, and their latest recalibration under Law No. 4 of 2026. The findings 
show that Bank Indonesia combines constitutional recognition with statutorily structured operational 
autonomy, an expanded monetary and macroprudential mandate, inter-institutional financial-stability 
coordination, and increasingly structured parliamentary accountability. Unlike the treaty-entrenched 
European Central Bank and the predominantly statute-based Federal Reserve and Bank of England, 
Bank Indonesia occupies an intermediate constitutional position. The article conceptualises this 
arrangement as Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking, in which constitutional entrenchment, 
legislative adaptability, operational independence, and democratic accountability coexist. The post
2026 framework further demonstrates that the central constitutional challenge is not whether Bank 
Indonesia remains formally independent, but how accountability and coordination can be strengthened 
without permitting political interference in monetary judgment.