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France's Foreign Policy on Russia - Ukraine Conflict a Review with Poliheuristic Theory

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Abstract

The present study aims to identify and analyse the rational factors considered by France in responding to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In response, France pursued a rational foreign policy, taking into account a number of factors, both national and personal. The present study employs a qualitative research method, adopting a case study approach. The present study employs secondary data and a process of literature review. The analysis of data is a process which encompasses two fundamental techniques: data sufficiency and testing processes. This study employs a comprehensive literature review to identify discrepancies and variations with previous research. The findings of this study demonstrate that the factors considered in French foreign policy are cognitive psychology and rational calculation. These two elements were analysed and became the primary considerations for France in formulating policies to support Ukraine over Russia. This was deduced from meticulous calculations in the disciplines of economics, politics and security. The calculations demonstrated that France's foreign policy was characterised by a high degree of rationality, underscoring the substantial ramifications of the decision to abstain from providing support to Ukraine. France has the prerogative to disregard specific non-compensatory factors, even if these factors ultimately prove advantageous to France. For instance, there are economic advantages to be gained, particularly in the context of collaboration with Russia. Consequently, this research will be of particular interest to scholars in the field of foreign policy.

Key Words

Foreign policy, poliheuristic theory, Russia-Ukraine conflict, Emmanuel Macron, strategic decision-making

1. Introduction

Every country uses foreign policy as a tool to achieve its national interests. To this end, countries as rational actors try to choose each alternative to maximise benefits and minimise costs. Rational choice theory is defined as an instrument related to goals or goal choices. The decision-making process of unified actors in determining national interests is often characterised as rational. Rationality or rational choice is defined as a decision-making process guided by carefully defining the situation, weighing objectives, considering all alternatives, and selecting the alternative most likely to achieve higher objectives. To decide on the choice to be made by the

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agent, rational choice attempts to provide an explanation of the optimal choice for decision-makers.

On 24 February 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine. Officials from the US intelligence community warned that Russia was expected to have planned the invasion for early 2022 (Global Conflict Tracker, 2022). Russian President Vladimir Putin then announced a military campaign in Ukraine and warned other countries that interfering with Russian operations would only lead to 'consequences they have never seen before.' He said the attack, which began on Thursday, was necessary to defend civilians in eastern Ukraine, a pretext that the US warned would be used to justify an 'invasion.' Putin accused the US and its allies of ignoring Russia's demands that they block Ukraine from joining NATO and provide security guarantees to Moscow in a televised address. Russia's goal, he insisted, was not to occupy Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia's military campaign was aimed at 'demilitarising' Ukraine. Putin has urged Ukrainian forces to 'immediately lay down their arms and return home.' The announcement has heightened suspicions that Moscow is using it to create a pretext for conflict, as feared by the West.

President Putin is also a decisive, authoritative leader who is unafraid of consequences and optimistic about his actions. The decisions made by the president are seen as defensive measures against potential threats. The existence of a security dilemma has made Putin increasingly confident and resolute in his decision to invade Ukraine. However, his invasion has drawn negative responses and led to sanctions from countries like the United States. One of the sanctions imposed was to ban Russian-operated aircraft from US airspace and restrict the movement of the Russian Central Bank, which could cause the ruble to weaken. However, to prevent Russia from experiencing a crisis due to the sanctions imposed by the United States, rather than issuing a policy to stop gas sales to opposing countries, it would be more beneficial for Russia to continue selling gas but with a new policy that transactions must be made in rubles.

In the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, France can be said to be in a vulnerable position due to its status as an EU member state. France is a country that upholds national sovereignty and is open to any country, and it is also a trading partner of Russia. To formulate France's policy and position on this conflict, several policy alternatives are needed. These alternatives are useful for clarifying France's position and response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With these policy alternatives, France can assess the potential impacts of the positions it may adopt. The alternatives available to France include supporting Ukraine by condemning Russia's invasion or remaining neutral and not intervening in the affairs of the two countries. Both alternatives have their own consequences, particularly in terms of political and economic stability, as well as France's position.

Relations between Russia and France have undergone a significant transformation from a strategic partnership to open confrontation in recent years. Initially, the two countries formed an important alliance in 1894 based on shared economic and security interests. However, this dynamic changed dramatically following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. France, which had previously acted as a mediator with a constructive approach—such as Macron's famous diplomatic efforts with the statement 'do not humiliate Russia'—has now become one of Ukraine's main supporters in the European Union. This shift in position is marked by the delivery of heavy weapons such as CAESAR howitzers and AMX-10RC combat vehicles, as well as increasingly stringent economic sanctions against Moscow.

On the other hand, the previously secondary relationship between France and Ukraine has developed into a deep strategic partnership. Before 2014, France focused more on its relationship with Russia, but after the annexation of Crimea, there was a significant change in policy. France is now the third-largest military supporter of Ukraine in Europe after Germany and the United Kingdom, not only in terms of military aid but also in international diplomacy and

political support across various EU forums. This commitment has strengthened further following the full-scale invasion in 2022, with total aid provided reaching billions of euros. (Efanova & Polyakova, 2019; Ermakova, 2023)

Table 1. French Investment in Russia

No	Company	Sector	Year in	Total of Workers (±)
1	Groupe Auchan (Ашан)	Retail / Trade	2002	41.000
2	Leroy Merlin	Retail / Trade	2004	30.000
3	Renault	Automotive	1998	No Information
4	Danone	Food Industry	1992	No Information
5	L'Oréal	Cosmetics / Perfume	1990	No Information
6	Sanofi	Pharmacy	1994	No Information
7	Schneider Electric	Common Supply	1993	No Information

Source: Efanova & Polyakova, 2019; Ermakova, 2023

At the time of writing, France has decided to support Ukraine and condemn Russia for its invasion. By affirming its position on this conflict, there are advantages and consequences that must be borne. Condemning Russia will result in support and strength from the US and other Western countries, and this action will also further strengthen Germany's position in the EU. Meanwhile, Germany must also be prepared to face the consequences of its actions. The long-standing trade cooperation with Russia is at stake. As a country that obtains 90% of its natural gas from Russia, France must be prepared in case Russia were to suddenly halt trade relations with France and other European countries.

The decision made by France to condemn Russia's invasion and support Ukraine. Through this poliheuristic analysis, the background behind France's decision can be understood. In this case, France chose to support Ukraine with the consideration that the support provided by France would bring France closer to the European Union and the United States to strengthen cooperation, including with NATO, despite the consequence of halting the cooperation between France and Russia.

Implications of the Conflict: Economic, Social, Political, and Military Dimensions

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has generated catastrophic consequences across multiple dimensions with global ramifications. Economically, the war has created severe disruptions extending far beyond the immediate participants, with Russia's economy contracting significantly due to inflation reaching 9% by 2024 and the central bank maintaining a 21% interest rate to combat price pressures under extensive international sanctions. Ukraine has suffered even more severe economic devastation, losing significant agricultural production capacity and grain export capabilities that traditionally formed major economic pillars, while global food prices reached all-time highs in March 2022 due to supply disruptions from both countries. (Bebler, 2015) The broader global economy has experienced substantial impacts through elevated commodity and energy prices, exacerbating food shortages and inflation worldwide, particularly forcing European countries dependent on Russian energy to rapidly diversify supply sources and accelerate transitions to alternative energy systems.(Ermakova, 2023; Myhre et al., 2024)

The human and military costs have been devastating, with Russian military casualties reaching over 400,000 annually according to reports, while Ukrainian sources claim Russia lost approximately 430,000 soldiers in 2024 alone. Military equipment losses have been equally

substantial, with Ukrainian defense ministry data indicating Russian forces lost 3,689 tanks in 2024 (equivalent to 119 tank battalions) and artillery losses valued at approximately \$8 billion, representing massive resource depletion affecting both countries' long-term military and economic capabilities. The civilian toll includes displacement of millions of Ukrainians, destruction of critical infrastructure, disruption of basic services, and psychological trauma extending across entire communities and generations.(Biersack & O'Lear, 2014; Ismail et al., 2024)

Politically and socially, the conflict has fundamentally reshaped European security architecture and international relations, exemplified by France's transformation from a mediator seeking to avoid "humiliating Russia" to becoming one of Ukraine's primary supporters. This realignment has strengthened transatlantic ties while creating new dependencies and vulnerabilities, accelerating European integration in defense matters through increased coordination on military aid and sanctions regimes, though also exposing divisions within the international community. The war has created a massive refugee crisis with millions of Ukrainians displaced internationally, creating social pressures across Europe while disrupting educational systems, healthcare infrastructure, and social services in affected regions, with psychological impacts on civilian populations, particularly children, representing long-term challenges requiring sustained international attention.(Begum & Khan, 2023; Rodgers & Lanoszka, 2023)

Global Instability and International System Disruption

If this conflict continues without resolution and the parties remain locked in confrontation, the consequences for global stability and the international system will be profound and far-reaching. Continued conflict poses critical risks to global order through the erosion of international law and established norms regarding territorial sovereignty, creating precedents that could encourage similar conflicts elsewhere and weakening the foundation of the international system that has provided relative stability since World War II.(Simonova, 2023; Wilhelmsen & Hjermand, 2022) The prolonged economic disruption threatens to create permanent shifts in global trade patterns and supply chains, forcing countries to choose sides in what increasingly resembles economic bloc competition and potentially fragmenting the global economy into competing spheres of influence.

Extended conflict maintains dangerous pressure on global energy and food systems, where continued warfare threatens recurring supply shocks that could trigger new waves of inflation and economic instability, particularly affecting developing countries already struggling with post-pandemic recovery. The disruption of grain exports from both Ukraine and Russia affects global food security with potential for recurring crises that could trigger social unrest and political instability in food-importing regions, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Most critically, the extended nature of this conflict increases risks of escalation beyond conventional warfare, as the involvement of nuclear-armed states raises unprecedented escalation scenarios, while the normalization of conflict between major powers creates precedents encouraging more aggressive behavior by other regional powers globally.(Maneejuk et al., 2024)

The conflict has already strained international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and various multilateral economic organizations, with prolonged confrontation threatening to further erode their effectiveness and potentially leading to fragmentation or replacement with competing institutional arrangements. This division of the world into competing camps undermines collective approaches to global challenges such as climate change, pandemic preparedness, and economic development, leaving the international community less capable of responding to future crises. If the conflict becomes a prolonged stalemate, it risks creating a permanently divided international system characterized by ongoing tensions, arms races, and

economic fragmentation, representing a fundamental departure from the post-Cold War international order with implications for global prosperity, security, and cooperation that could persist for decades, severely compromising the international community's ability to address other global challenges from climate change to technological governance to global health.

2. Literature Review: Poliheuristic Theory

As David Easton said, decision-making is the act of choosing among available options from a number of uncertainties. With that, a decision maker will implement an alternative as a policy and therefore, not all alternatives will be part of the policy. Leaders make decisions at the individual, group, and coalition levels (Hermann, 2001). (LaRoche & Pratt, 2018) Studies have found that the way they process information and the decision rules they use influence their choices (Mintz & Geva, 1997). Leaders make foreign policy decisions in various contexts and environments. Some decisions are individualistic, while others are made in groups. There are several decision-making models that can be used: the rational actor model, cybernetic theory, prospect theory, poliheuristic theory, small theory model, bureaucratic politics, and organisational politics. In this analysis, we use the Small Theory and Poliheuristic Theory models to explain the foreign policy decisions made and implemented by the United States in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. (Manning, 1960)

The Poliheuristic Theory is an analytical theory that connects two approaches in the formulation of foreign policy, namely the cognitive approach and the rational approach. The theory presented by Alex Mintz in his book titled 'The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making' states that when decision-making is taking place, the cognitive and rational choice conditions of a country are considered. Foreign policy is viewed as a country's response to ongoing domestic and international issues, which are then followed up with the aim of fulfilling and achieving the country's national interests in various fields. The basic assumption of rational choice theory is that the international environment determines the actions of a country as an actor, all foreign policy decision-makers are almost the same in prioritising the policy-making process, each country's choice makes the process appear as a single actor in making choices, and each single actor makes rational choices.

The poliheuristic theory focuses on the why and how of decision-making processes. The main argument is that decision-makers are subject to cognitive and environmental constraints and focus on the political consequences of their decisions. The poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision-making. PH assumes a two-step decision-making process. The first phase reduces a set of possible options by applying the 'non-compensation principle' to eliminate alternatives that have unacceptable consequences in important areas, usually political decision-making. When the set of options is reduced to those acceptable to the decision-maker. The process moves to the second stage, where decision-makers use more analytical processing to minimise risk and maximise benefits. This theory focuses on five main characteristics of information processing: order-sensitive, non-holistic, and dimension-based search, as well as non-compensable and satisfying decision rules (Mintz, 2004).

3. Research Method

The present study employs qualitative methodology. Qualitative research is defined as a type of research that emphasises the explanation of phenomena based on narratives. The data provided is of a descriptive nature, with the narrative explanations eschewing numerical data. The present study employs a case study method that focuses on a phenomenon due to its uniqueness in the event. The present study employs secondary data, signifying that the research is not conducted through observation and interviews. The present study employs secondary data from a variety

of sources, including books, journals, reports, and internet sources, to elucidate the analysis. The present study employs a substantial dataset and a meticulous tracing process. This signifies that the author undertakes a detailed analysis of the object under study by means of meticulous tracking. This process will render the data provided more detailed. The research process involves a rigorous validation procedure, ensuring the reliability of the data. This is followed by the scientific conclusion drawing, which is the final stage of the research. It is therefore evident that the analysis employed in this study adheres to the scientific principles that govern research in this field.

4. Results and Discussions

4.1. French's Rational Policy

In this case, Rational Choice in policy-making looks at how state actors can choose the most effective policy or maximise that decision to achieve their goals and interests. One of the first stages of the policy-making process is to determine the state's objectives on an issue, where policymakers have several aspects to consider in determining their objectives in terms of benefits, usefulness, or preferences. (Irondelle, 2008)

The discussion related to the four parts of Rational Action analysis, the first is Goals and Objectives, which explains that goals are general objectives while objectives are specific objectives in the near term. In this case, we can see France's goal of stopping Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Its objectives are to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and/or the European Union to achieve security. Second, Alternatives, where policymakers choose among all available policy alternatives under specific conditions. In this case, Ukraine must decide between joining NATO and collaborating with the European Union or remaining under Russia's influence. Given Ukraine's sovereignty as a nation, this decision requires careful consideration to maximise benefits and minimise costs.

Third, Consequences: this stage compares the strengths and weaknesses of all alternatives, along with their obstacles, where the alternatives available to France require further consideration. Each option has consequences that must be faced. Fourth, Choice: selecting the most feasible option to achieve France's objectives. With this, the French President also supports Ukraine becoming a new member of NATO. Thus, with the decision of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, it is stated that Ukraine's national interest is to join the European Union and/or NATO. This Ukrainian policy makes France feel that the decision is appropriate by joining the Western alliance. The aim is to maximise Ukraine's sovereignty and counter Russian influence. Why is Ukraine's policy important for the Western alliance and France in particular? Because in the case of Crimea, which is de jure owned by Russia, President Zelensky's decision-making is determined to include his country as part of the European Union and/or NATO. This situation could strengthen the Western alliance and expand the conflict between Ukraine, NATO, and the European Union. Waltz states that:

“Rational choice theory is individualistic: social and political outcomes are viewed as the collective product of individual choices (or as the product of choices made by unitary actors). - Rational choice theory assumes that each actor seeks to maximize its “subjective expected utility.” Given a particular set of preferences and a fixed array of possible choices, actors will select the outcome that brings the greatest expected benefits. The specification of actors’ preferences is subject to certain constraints: (a) an actor’s preferences must be complete (meaning we can rank order their preference for different outcomes); and (b) preferences must be transitive (if A is preferred to B and B to C, then A is preferred to C.

Waltz assumes that actors seek to maximise their interests, which they do by making choices that will yield the maximum results in achieving their preferences. Thus, rational choice specifies the preferences of actors with regard to certain constraints. It is clear that Russia does not want the former Soviet Union countries to become NATO allies; Russia wants to keep Ukraine within its orbit. For this reason, France, along with the Western alliance, supports Ukraine's efforts to counter Russia, as every country will fight for its own interests, whether it be France, Russia, or Ukraine. (Ewers-Peters, 2023; Shevchenko et al., 2020)

4.2. Poliheuristic Analysis on French's Foreign Policy

France's rational policy began with Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. France does not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and will not do so in the future: redrawing international borders by force is a violation of international law and the obligations of the Russian Federation. (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2022). As stated by French President Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on 24 September 2022, France strongly opposes Russia's midnight military invasion of Ukraine. It further condemns the use of Belarusian territory by the Lukashenko regime to carry out this attack against a sovereign state. This decision to wage war constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. As Europeans often say to their allies, it will have direct, significant, and costly implications. In these difficult times, I express my full solidarity with Ukraine's democratically elected leadership and the Ukrainian people. France will continue to assist Ukraine in every possible way. (Menon & Ruger, 2020; Olsen, 2020)

At the Crisis and Support Centre of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, the crisis unit has been activated. The crisis section of the French embassy, which is fully operational and focused on its mission in Kyiv, is making aggressive efforts to organise assistance for French nationals currently still on Ukrainian soil. This initiative will also help coordinate the efforts of various relevant government departments in the crisis. As the crisis unfolds, real-time advice will be provided to the French community (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022).

On 27 February 2022, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom decided to tighten sanctions against Russia. Blocking Russian banks from using SWIFT and imposing penalties on the Russian Central Bank are some of the steps taken. Japan has now joined other G7 countries in banning access to SWIFT for some Russian institutions (Anderson et al., 2022).

4.3. Cognitive Steps

In foreign policy analysis, especially when viewed through the lens of poliheuristic theory, one of the stages that must be understood is the cognitive stage. The cognitive stage is carried out by eliminating alternative choices or non-compensatory principles. In this case, policymakers will remove options that are unacceptable in one key dimension. The aim is for policymakers to exclude options that have at least one detrimental impact on national interests and the political interests of policymakers (Hidayatullah & Wahyudi, 2019). The author uses cognitive techniques in the first stage to answer the intent of the leader's activities as a decision-maker. Therefore, policymakers use a cognitive approach in the initial steps of this process.

The principle of non-compensatory policymakers is influenced by the quality or personality of the policymakers. Policymakers do not eliminate alternatives that are considered dangerous in terms of domestic politics because these choices may fulfil the desires or goals of the policymakers, either individually or collectively. This cognitive stage is then used to analyse French policy in its contribution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

French President Emmanuel Macron has many different policy alternatives when it comes to determining foreign policy, particularly in terms of providing assistance to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia, which he may eliminate in accordance with his non-compensatory principle. The following are some of his alternatives:

Table 2. Macron’s Alternative

Option	Alternative	Component
A1	French’s Role is only as an observer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only as an Observer/Watcher • Did not involve in any peace treatment • Cautious • Choose to Abstain on a conferencei
A2	France give sanction to russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demanding an immediate end to Russian military operations • Blocking Russian banks • Freezing Russian assets and restricting access to global financial markets • French bank Crédit Agricole has announced its withdrawal from Russia.

Source: Processed by author

Rational Step

Table 3. Calculation of Policy Rationality

Code	Dimension	Considerations
B1	Politic	‘Will the decision help France in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict?’
B2	Economy	‘Will the decision have an impact on the French economy?’
B3	Security	“Will France be able to survive with this policy?”

Source: Processed by author

Table 4. Calculation of Policy Rationality

Code	Dimension	Considerations	Weigh Value A1	Wight Value A2
B1	Politic	‘Will the decision help France in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict?’	0	2
B2	Economy	‘Will the decision have an impact on the French economy?’	2	3
B3	Security	‘Will France be able to survive with this policy?’	0	4

Source: Processed by author

As seen in Tables 2 and 3, in option A2, France uses this option to contribute to the resolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in which case France believes that there is still room for diplomacy by viewing this option in accordance with its beliefs, values, and ideology. In the economic dimension, the policy under Option A2 could certainly impact France's economy. Given

that Russia is the primary supplier of gas and crude oil to European countries, including France, this could exacerbate the global economic crisis.

Of course, the policy adopted reflects how the French government makes decisions based on rational calculations of costs and benefits, which serve as justification for the policies that have been decided upon.

4.4. France's Leader Personality Type: Emanuel Macron.

Macron, as the 25th President of France, is the descendant of a scientist, namely a Professor of Neurology, which shaped his upbringing in an educated environment. Macron pursued his education at the elite high school Lycée Henri IV in Paris, specialising in philosophy, before entering the banking sector. The 'lightweight populist' personality attributed to Macron by Manuel Valls, the former Prime Minister of France, became a unique and unusual attraction among French politicians. In 2017, Macron was elected President of France, defeating Marine Le Pen. Macron then became closely associated with the identity of being the youngest President in French history. His victory was achieved through promises and commitments to a leadership style that would bring a more open France, prioritising innovation and economic reform, and protecting the people amid global uncertainty, with an emphasis on strategic global partnerships aligned with the values of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity (Kompas, 2017). His confident personality has been evident since his candidacy for the French presidency as a young politician seeking to break away from the mainstream parties. Macron is also known as a leader who prioritises humanitarian issues in the international arena.

In the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, France has firmly maintained the position that Russia's actions constitute an attack on the fundamental rules and norms of international law that have been in place since World War II. France will hold Russia accountable and views these actions as a strategic failure for Russia in terms of international law. However, amid a world that condemns and shuns Putin as Russia's leader, Macron is one of the few leaders who is trying to keep the lines of communication open with Putin. Macron continues to intensify diplomatic efforts to prevent war, with the two leaders having spoken four times since February. Macron's continued efforts to pursue dialogue reflect his active role as president in seeking to de-escalate and find a way out of the crisis. In addition to France's actions as part of the European Union, Macron is also striving to speak from the perspective of the Ukrainian people to secure justice from the ceasefire targeting civilians (The Press Democrat, 2022).

France's foreign policy of remaining actively involved in alleviating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates the Active-Positive personality type according to James Barber's classification. Emanuel Macron, as the leader of France who prioritises respect or dignity, values productivity, and consistently works to achieve his goals—in this case, France's national interests—the Active-Positive personality also has the ability to socialise effectively. Through his foreign policy towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Macron seeks to maintain global peace, particularly in Europe.

5. Conclusion

Russia's invasion of Ukraine occurred because Ukraine wanted to join NATO, but Russia did not approve of this. Russia stated that no country should interfere in this conflict. On 24 September 2022, Ukraine's Minister for European and Foreign Affairs said that France strongly opposed Russia's midnight military invasion of Ukraine. The United Kingdom and several other countries decided to tighten sanctions against Russia. Blocking Russian banks from using SWIFT and imposing penalties on the Russian Central Bank were some of the measures taken.

The polyheuristic theory in Foreign Policy Analysis Theory focuses on the why and how of the decision-making process. The main argument is that decision-makers are constrained by cognitive and environmental factors. It also focuses on the political consequences of their decisions. If we look at it through the lens of poliheuristic theory, one of the stages that must be understood is the cognitive stage. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is linked to poliheuristic theory at the cognitive stage, which is useful in analysing France's policy in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. France's policy alternatives have two options, as shown in the table on page 4. The reason for France's policy alternatives is to address the crisis between Russia and Ukraine and participate in efforts to resolve it. However, in the end, France remains committed to its position of intensifying diplomatic efforts to prevent war.

Foreign policy analysis using the poliheuristic theory is a logical framework that transcends both psychological cognition and rational calculation. From this foreign policy analysis, it is evident that France's foreign policy indeed considers both elements as the orientation of its foreign policy. Therefore, foreign policy is not something that is partial between psychological cognition and rational calculation. Because if separated, it would make foreign policy analysis non-empirical and overly centralised intuition.

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