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# Indigenous Inclusion in Global Trade: New Zealand's CPTPP Strategy for Māori (2019–2023)

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## Abstract

This study aims to analyze how New Zealand achieves Māori inclusion in trade through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). New Zealand's policy is crucial for addressing three main challenges: the need for adaptation and a deep understanding of cultural, political, and trade practices aligned with the CPTPP. The methods used in this study include document analysis, policy analysis, and a literature review to understand the relationship between New Zealand and the Māori in cooperating under a free trade agreement. The research findings indicate that during the 2019–2023 period, New Zealand undertook several policy initiatives to achieve inclusive trade for Māori through the CPTPP. These policies include the establishment of the official board TFAAB, which functions to provide recommendations and critiques regarding decisions and policies made by the Crown related to inclusive trade in the CPTPP. New Zealand also established institutions and support communities that specifically act as Māori representatives in addressing provisions to be agreed upon in the CPTPP, such as *Te Taumata, Ngā Toki Whakarururanga*, FOMA, and the National Iwi Chairs Forum. During this period, New Zealand also offered solutions to address claims raised by the Māori, such as the revision of the Plant Variety Act and matters related to digital trade.

## Key Words

New Zealand, inclusive trade, Māori, CPTPP.

## 1. Introduction

Free trade agreements (FTAs) seem to have a reasonably positive trend in the topic of international trade in the 21st century. The Pacific region is proof of the positive trend in confidence among countries in the area to increase economic and trade intensity through FTAs. For example, the formation of two mega FTAs that have recently become hot topics of discussion, namely the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

CPTPP is a comprehensive regional agreement that aims to promote economic integration and trade and investment liberalization among its member countries (Ajibo et al., 2019). The CPTPP was ratified on March 8, 2018, and currently has 11 member countries, including Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam (Suominen, 2021).

New Zealand sees the CPTPP as a promising agreement, prompting it to immediately decide to ratify the CPTPP even after the United States withdrawal. Evidence of New Zealand's

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enthusiasm and interest is demonstrated in the National Interest Analysis (NIA) report on the CPTPP prepared by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) (Corbin & Perry, 2018;21-22).

The NIA report (Corbin & Perry, 2018; MFAT, 2018) highlights three key reasons for New Zealand's participation: enhanced trade and economic relations, opportunities for market access, and improved trade rule coherence. Specifically, the report details numerous benefits, such as the elimination of tariffs on forest products, including processed products originating from New Zealand forests, as part of the CPTPP, including in Japan, which is New Zealand's fourth largest export market, and Vietnam, which is New Zealand's ninth most significant market. Second, prior to joining the CPTPP, all New Zealand fish and fish products imported into Japan were subject to tariffs. However, these will be progressively eliminated over 11 years, with the remaining 99% of tariffs to be eliminated over 16 years. Another benefit is that all tariffs on New Zealand kiwifruit will be eliminated upon the entry into force of the CPTPP, including duty-free access to Japan, which is New Zealand's third-largest kiwifruit market, with the tariff reduction valued at over \$20 million.

Fourth, all tariffs on New Zealand wine will be eliminated, including duty-free access to Canada, which is New Zealand's fourth-largest wine market. The fifth benefit is that nearly all import tariffs on New Zealand lamb will be eliminated upon the entry into force of the CPTPP, including the locking in of preferential tariffs for Canada, which is New Zealand's 57th largest market for lamb. Sixth, all import tariffs on New Zealand apples to Japan will be progressively eliminated over 11 years. Further benefits include a reduction in tariffs on beef exports to Japan from 38.5 percent to 9 percent over a period of 16 years. This is the best deal Japan has ever offered to any trade agreement partner.

On January 1, 2022, the reduction in export tariffs will already be felt, with tariffs on beef to Japan reduced by more than a third. Finally, dairy products will benefit from an estimated total tariff reduction of NZ\$85 million through special access to new quotas, such as Japan, Canada, and Mexico, in addition to the elimination of tariffs on certain products (Elms, 2018).

These anticipated economic gains, particularly in sectors like forestry, agriculture, and fisheries, underscored New Zealand's interest in the CPTPP. Given that the Māori economy is significantly anchored in these very commodities (Schulze, 2018), the agreement presented a potential avenue for their economic advancement. However, beneath this promising outlook, significant challenges to Māori inclusion emerged through international trade. The Māori economy generally derives from a variety of commodities, such as forest products, lamb and wool, dairy products, seafood, and kiwifruit (Schulze, 2018). In line with the primary sources of the Māori economy, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT, 2018) highlights several benefits gained through CPTPP membership in areas considered as opportunities for the Māori community to develop its trade and as part of achieving inclusive trade.

However, there are several issues that have emerged behind the attractive scheme analyzed in the NIA regarding the CPTPP. Based on a working paper related to the "all for trade and trade for all" agenda, New Zealand states that international trade through the CPTPP is still not inclusive, especially for the Māori community. This is due to misrepresentation that has caused a gap and resulted in the mis-redistribution of income through the CPTPP between the Māori and Pākehā (NZ European) groups (MFAT, 2022).

The misrepresentation of Māori and its causes were revealed at an official conference held by the University of Waikato, which ran for two days from June 28 to 29, 2023. Māori groups believe that New Zealand, within the framework of the CPTPP, has not been able to protect rangatiratanga (self-determination) and mana (power and authority) following the Treaty of

Waitangi, particularly in the article regarding recognition of land and property (taonga) rights, over which Māori tribes have complete control (Paul Mika & Maniapoto, 2023). This study aims to provide an analysis of a country's decisions and policies in influencing a free trade agreement and in implementing it within an indigenous community. The study also examines how indigenous communities engage in processes and dynamics to preserve their cultural and political values amid economic interests or liberalization. This article's analysis will be divided into three parts. The first part discusses New Zealand and Māori perspectives on FTAs, with the aim of understanding the motives and interests of each party in FTAs. The second part regarding the Māori community's opposition to the CPTPP in support of inclusive trade, it is recognized that several issues in the CPTPP are not in line with the original objectives, especially concerning the Māori community. The third part or last part will discuss New Zealand's Response and Policy in Realizing Inclusive Trade Māori, focusing on New Zealand's actions regarding the discussion in the previous section.

## **2. Literature Review/Analytical Framework**

### **2.1. Free Trade Agreements**

Free trade agreements (FTAs) have become well-established instruments in the realm of international trade and trade liberalization. FTAs are generally defined as agreements involving cooperation between two or more countries, with dynamics and policies aimed at reducing trade barriers such as import quotas and tariffs, and increasing trade in goods and services between the countries involved in the agreement (O'sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). Based on this definition, FTAs also have the power to protect Government procurement, intellectual property rights, and competition policies (Grimson, 2014). The removal of trade barriers in FTAs is intended to make it easier for a country's industry to reach or open up new market shares and increase product sales without discrimination.

Measures to promote fair distribution of trade benefits among all member countries. Generally, in FTAs, there are agreements called "non-reciprocal agreements" and "partial scope agreements." Non-reciprocal agreements are agreements that provide preferential access to a country for specific reasons without any obligation to reciprocate. Partial scope agreements are trade agreements that only cover specific sectors before the full implementation of the FTA. This is considered an initial step before a country commits to a broader FTA (Dent, 2006;16).

There are several variations in the dynamics of FTAs based on the political or economic interactions of the countries involved. According to Dent (2006;19-20), such differentiation or variation can take the form of the scope of liberalization, rules of origin regime, content and emphasis of "broad band" elements, and implementation schedules, modalities, and other arrangements. The scope of liberalization can be seen in the practice of FTAs, as FTAs do not always mean total free trade, where some countries typically have exceptions for specific sectors and phased schedules for liberalization, based on the protection of particular industries.

The rules of origin regime refer to the determination of a product's eligibility for FTA preferential tariffs based on how much of its production or raw materials originates from FTA member countries. The emphasis on "broad band" elements refers to FTA models with a broader and more complex scope, not limited to tariffs, but also including technical standards, investment protection, intellectual property rights, labor, and the environment.

Implementation schedules, modalities, and other arrangements explain the timeline for a country's liberalization within an FTA to achieve full liberalization, with some FTAs requiring over 20 years to reach full liberalization (Dent, 2006;20). This model also provides insights into liberalization methods within FTAs, such as the "negative list" and "positive list" approaches.

A positive list means that liberalization only applies to sectors explicitly listed in the free trade agreement. If a new sector emerges in the future, renegotiation is required for it to be liberalized. This method emphasizes a country's control to ensure that only specified sectors are liberalized. A negative list is the opposite of the previous method, where all sectors are considered open to liberalization except those explicitly excluded. The advantage of this method is that there is no need for renegotiation when new sectors emerge due to digital and technological developments, and it also plays a significant role in expanding market access due to the reduction in the list of exclusions.

The formation of an FTA generally goes through a series of mechanisms that seem simple, but the stages take quite a long time due to the complexity that prolongs the discussion process to achieve the interests of each stakeholder. Some of these stages are the initial proposal (official proposed), feasibility or scoping study, negotiation (some countries include public consultation and stakeholder engagement in the negotiation phase to gather input from affected sectors and enhance the legitimacy and accountability of the negotiated FTA), drafting, finalization and initialing, and finally ratification (Dent, 2006;17-18).

## **2.2. Inclusive Trade**

Inclusive trade refers to a trade approach that seeks to ensure that the benefits of international trade are felt more evenly by all groups in society (Goff, 2021). Another definition of inclusive trade is a trade policy approach that aims to ensure that the benefits of international trade can be enjoyed by everyone, especially historically marginalized groups, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), indigenous peoples, and other marginalized groups (Bacchetta et al., 2021).

The concept of inclusive trade has a primary objective, namely to create better outcomes for more people as a result of trade, and in the process, ideally ensure that the benefits of trade are widely enjoyed (Goff, 2021). As with any concept, inclusive trade is based on the intention to understand, explain, and resolve issues in this field. The concept of inclusive trade is supported by three main elements in understanding it and can be used to assess the status of achievement and improvement of inclusive trade in a country.

The first element considered in inclusive trade is marginalized or excluded groups, which currently include workers, indigenous communities, or gender. This marginalization is understood due to limited participation in decision-making regarding policy formulation and unequal distribution of the benefits of trade. The second element refers to issues affected by trade, such as dispute resolution processes, also known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), labor standards, regulatory autonomy, and environmental sustainability. The third element concerns transparency and participation, particularly in trade consultation activities (Velut et al., 2022).

The process of inclusivity is not only focused on a free trade agreement (FTA), but the opportunity for redistribution may also lie in domestic policies that accompany efforts to achieve an inclusive trade agenda in FTA negotiations (Fraser, 2000). The issue that often lies at the heart of the failure to achieve inclusive trade is injustice, which can be further divided into three dimensions: economic, cultural, and political, none of which can be reduced because of the other dimensions (Fraser, 2006). This situation has further implications for trust in the trade system, which is directly linked to the representation of various groups, leading to a decline in trust and an inability to achieve inclusive trade conditions. Trust has a strong influence on the realization of inclusive trade, as it affects the formation of trade legitimacy created by public support because they believe that trade ensures fair and equal opportunities for every group (Prévost et al., 2019;36-48).

This study employs a multi-dimensional framework to analyze inclusive trade, drawing on Fraser's (2006, 2008) and Goff's (2021) conceptualizations. We will examine inclusive trade through three interconnected dimensions – cultural, political, and economic – which will subsequently structure the analysis of New Zealand's policies in the Results and Discussions section.

### **3. Research Method**

In this article, the author uses qualitative research methodology. The use of qualitative research in this study is based on the author's intention to obtain a comprehensive social experience through various literature on international trade among the Māori people and the CPTPP during the period 2019-2023. By not focusing solely on statistical data, the implications are expected to be broader and better represent the reality experienced by the Māori community in the free trade agreement. Therefore, based on the research objectives and desired outcomes, the research design for this article employs a qualitative approach.

The author conducted a literature review by searching for information and data from various sources, including books, journals, articles, scientific papers, online media, print media, and official reports. The author chose the literature review method as a data collection technique because the topic being discussed has a significant amount of data and findings from previous researchers. Hence, the author's objective is to complement and fill the gaps in previous research. This method was also chosen due to the limitations of distance and circumstances that did not support direct data collection based on the specified period.


## **4. Results and Discussions**

### **4.1. New Zealand and Māori perspectives on the Free Trade Agreement**

FTAs hold a meaningful place for New Zealand, especially in terms of policy direction as part of its economic and political strategy. This stems from geographical and historical factors that have shaped New Zealand's economic characteristics. New Zealand is known to have a relatively small land area and population, spanning approximately 268,000 km<sup>2</sup> with a population of 5.3 million people. The country consists of two main islands, the North and South Islands, and based on its land area, New Zealand ranks 76th among all countries (CIA, 2025).

These two factors provide a sufficient basis for understanding why New Zealand is one of the countries most dependent on export activities, with external markets playing a crucial role (Dent, 2006, 87). The characterization of New Zealand as an export-dependent country is further supported by research from Lederman & Lesniak (2018), which states that limited domestic markets and domestic consumption play a significant role in driving a country to open up to international trade, such as through export and import activities, as a means to achieve economies of scale and growth. This stems from New Zealand's relatively small land area and population, which, in a domestic context, makes it a small state economy.

As for the Māori, the indigenous people of New Zealand, they are not a group that isolates itself from international trade. However, Māori trade practices, particularly in export activities, are driven by a sense of identity and rooted in cultural values, not merely profit-driven (Jurado & Mika, 2023).



**Figure 1.** Māori Export Practice Framework.

Source: Jurado & Mika, 2023

To understand Māori concerns within the CPTPP, this section begins by outlining the Māori export practice framework in Figure 1, which shapes how Māori participate in international trade that focus not only on economic gain, but also consider cultural identity, social relationships, and sustainability, where Māori cultural values play an important role in shaping the way they do business in the global market, such as the two principles that are always upheld, namely *whanaungatanga* (caring for others) and *manaakitanga* (caring for nature and the environment). The presence of the pillar "A strong sense of identity" emphasizes that Māori identity is intertwined with the attitude of each exporter in building narratives and business relationships, which in this case can be utilized as a means of creating authentic value in Māori trade. This identity is not individualistic but collective, based on genealogy (*whakapapa*), land (*whenua*), and community (*iwi*, *hapū*, *whānau*).

The next pillar is relationship-driven, which emphasizes that trade for Māori is not merely a process and completion of transactions, but has a deeper purpose and meaning, namely building relationships, as in the popular narrative, "Non-Māori companies go to China to complete transactions, Māori companies go to China to create relationships.". The two pillars above are connected to stakeholder-driven, where each Māori individual represents trade by upholding the good name of their community, which becomes the "Māori exporting style."

These cultural principles also shape how Māori assess the fairness of trade agreements. When trade policies conflict with these values, Māori rely on institutional mechanisms—such as the Waitangi Tribunal—to challenge potential breaches (Jurado & Mika, 2023). As is known, Māori international trade operates under the authority of the Crown or New Zealand, although Māori retain the right to participate in decision-making regarding policies. In response to this, the Waitangi Tribunal was established with the task of investigating claims or lawsuits from Māori that the New Zealand Government has violated the principles or contents of the Waitangi Treaty. In this case, every principle and obligation of New Zealand to continue to pay attention to the provisions of the treaty in every free trade agreement that will be made applies (Waitangi Tribunal, 2023).

#### 4.2. Māori opposition to the CPTPP in support of inclusive trade

The CPTPP is touted as one of the FTAs that is capable of protecting all groups within a country so that they can jointly reap the full benefits of a free trade agreement without discrimination, especially for New Zealand (MFAT, 2018). The inclusive measures found in the design of the

CPTPP as an FTA are even evident in the preamble of the CPTPP text regarding the emphasis on indigenous peoples' rights and trade inclusivity, which explicitly states: "reaffirm the importance of promoting corporate social responsibility, cultural identity and diversity, environmental protection and conservation, gender equality, indigenous rights, labor rights, inclusive trade, sustainable development, and traditional knowledge, as well as the importance of preserving their right to regulate in the public interest" (Harré, 2020).

The CPTPP also addresses the protection of indigenous peoples' intellectual property rights within its provisions and recognizes practices related to environmental protection that are exempt from certain obligations (Frisch, 2022). During the period from 2019 to 2023, five years after the CPTPP was ratified and came into effect in New Zealand, the FTA received a fairly negative response from Māori groups, as documented in the WAI 2522 report. WAI 2522 is lawsuits and negotiations by the Māori tribe against the Crown in voicing concerns about trade provisions, such as those in the CPTPP (Stewart, 2021;91)

According to the claims in WAI 2522, under the Treaty of Waitangi, which also establishes Māori as treaty partners of New Zealand, Māori assert that the Crown has failed to meet the "active protection" standards as stipulated in the treaty (Waitangi Tribunal, 2023). This statement has made the Māori reluctant and distrustful of the CPTPP, which had become a significant challenge for New Zealand in achieving inclusive trade. The lawsuits and claims reported by the Māori are based on several articles of the CPTPP that are inconsistent with Māori values, which is believed to be due to the New Zealand Government's lack of negotiation and consultation with the Māori in the decisions made in the CPTPP.

The Māori's central claims primarily challenge specific articles within the CPTPP's Electronic Commerce chapter, including 14.11, 14.13, 14.17, and 10.6 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2023). These provisions, which promote free data flow, restrict local presence requirements, and limit government access to source code, are perceived by Māori as undermining *kaitiaki* (stewardship) over their data (*taonga* and *mātauranga*) are understood like an ancient tree whose roots penetrate the deepest layers of the earth, where those roots are understood as Māori *mātauranga*, and the fruit is *taonga*. If those roots are uprooted or poisoned, the tree dies, and there will be no fruit for future Māori generations (Waitangi Tribunal, 2023).

Further opposition arises from concerns that New Zealand might accede to the UPOV 1991 Convention, as required by Annex 18-a of the CPTPP. Māori view this as a threat to their spiritual and cultural responsibility to protect traditional plants (*taonga* species) like *kūmara* and *harakeke*, as UPOV 1991 grants exclusive rights to plant breeders that could restrict indigenous use and sharing.

#### **4.3. New Zealand's Response and Policies in Achieving Inclusive Trade New Zealand**

"Trade for all" has become one of the important agendas in response to achieving inclusive international trade for New Zealand. This is based on the initiative of the Government, especially the Minister of Trade and Export Growth, who invited all New Zealand citizens to express their opinions on matters important to them regarding trade policy and trade agreements. The reason behind the launch of this agenda, as explained by the Minister of Trade and Export Growth, David Parker, is that the benefits and advantages of international trade should be felt evenly across the country, not just by large businesses and cities, but also by farmers, workers, technology entrepreneurs, women, Māori, and small and medium-sized enterprises. Additionally, he emphasized the importance of protecting the environment while optimizing existing and future trade agreement opportunities (Parker, 2018).

Trade for All was first introduced and implemented in 2019, particularly in August. The essence of this agenda is the awareness to maximize trade policies, which are the key to New

Zealand's ability to create a trade environment that can modernize the economy and support local businesses and exporters in competing in the global market, thereby achieving progressive, sustainable, and inclusive conditions (Parker, 2018).

New Zealand's policy focus is divided into three dimensions as the root causes of the failure to achieve inclusive Māori trade through the CPTPP, namely the cultural dimension, the political dimension, and the economic dimension. First, the cultural dimension refers to whether an individual or group is treated following their rights, where in inclusive trade, the benchmark in this dimension is the "explicit" recognition of the group and recognition of their unique rights or characteristics (Fraser, 2008;7).

Consistent with the first dimension of the analytical framework—cultural justice—this section evaluates whether CPTPP-related policies explicitly recognize Māori cultural rights. In international trade, Māori play an active role as participants in the market, engaging in activities such as exports and imports. However, the Māori community also bears the burden and responsibility of preserving and maintaining Māori traditional culture and customs, which are often threatened by trade systems—both policies and regulations—that are not inclusive due to the absence of discussion and negotiation processes involving them (Goff, 2021).

In response to this, the Māori people have emphasized that they do not need more trade policies and strategies that speak about them without them (Paul Mika & Maniapoto, 2023). This situation is not a trend of defending the Māori, during the TPP negotiation process, New Zealand faced a lot of criticism and lawsuits due to its lack of transparency, inclusivity, and democracy in the negotiation process, particularly regarding the involvement of the Māori as a partner in the agreement due to a lack of consultation with the Māori (Kawharu, 2016). Looking at the cultural issues experienced by the Māori people, one thing that the New Zealand Government needs to pay special attention to is "recognition" that goes beyond mere formality. Recognition includes providing equal treatment in public spaces, creating opportunities for them (Māori) to voice their opinions, and acknowledging and understanding their cultural beliefs, including the cultural obligations they uphold (Fraser, 2008).

Based on an analysis of the cultural dimension, New Zealand's policies aimed at achieving inclusive Māori trade through the CPTPP, as observed in the cultural dimension during the period 2019–2023, include the following. First, revising the Plant Variety Rights Act (PVR) through consultation with Māori stakeholders to ensure the PVR aligns with and protects Māori rights and obligations by their cultural values. Second, policies related to electronic commerce and digital trade, such as the launch of the Digital Strategy for Aotearoa (DSA), the development of Māori Data Governance, the establishment of the Mana Ōrite Agreement, and the adoption of cloud technology based on the principles of the Waitangi Treaty. These policies represent New Zealand's solutions and findings in addressing the WAI 2522 challenge regarding electronic commerce, particularly Articles 10.6, 14.11, 11.13, and 11.17 (Minister for Trade and Export Growth, 2022).

The Government acknowledges that there is a lack of understanding that has led to a failure to grasp the interests of Māori in digital trade and will continue to take corrective actions and open policy spaces in response to Māori claims. Several policies in digital trade that have been implemented, such as the launch of the Digital Strategy for Aotearoa (DSA), the development of Māori Data Governance, the establishment of the Mana Ōrite Agreement, and the adoption of cloud technology based on the principles of the Waitangi Treaty have received a fairly positive response, especially from the Māori tribe, as *taonga* and *matauranga* can be preserved and protected by Māori cultural values (Minister for Trade and Export Growth, 2022).


Second is the political dimension, which focuses on a situation involving the right of an individual or group to participate in decision-making through a deliberative process. Based on

this understanding, the political dimension focuses on the participation of all groups with such rights in the negotiation and consultation process regarding policies to be made. One of the benchmarks in this dimension is representation, which reveals one of the most significant issues within it, misrepresentation (Goff, 2021). In her understanding, Fraser argues that if indigenous communities are not consulted in free trade negotiations that affect their land or knowledge, this constitutes misrepresentation (Fraser, 2000). Thus, the benchmark in the political dimension is evident in the formal participation of these groups in the formulation of agreements.

Several policy findings by New Zealand in achieving inclusive Māori trade through the CPTPP fall within the political dimension during the period 2019–2023. First, the establishment of the TFAAB advisory board, which includes Māori tribes as representatives. Second, the establishment of institutions and communities with the capacity and ability to engage in negotiations as Māori representatives, including *Te Taumata, Nga Toki Whakarururanga*, and the National Iwi Chairs Forum. Third, strengthening collaboration between the Crown and Māori as treaty partners, not merely stakeholders, which enhances Māori representation in FTAs like the CPTPP. Fourth, Māori have the right and opportunity to negotiate directly, such as in the CPTPP Commission 2023. Fifth, New Zealand has launched a policy called "Have Your Say" as a platform for all groups, including Māori, to voice their opinions on future trade agendas (TFAAB, 2019).


Finally, the third dimension is the economic dimension, which is closely related to the fair distribution of wealth, resources, and economic opportunities for all groups. Within this, the economic dimension seeks to assess whether a country's policies have the power to provide more equitable economic access, such as financial support or improvements in maldistribution (Goff, 2021). This dimension plays an equally important role as a factor influencing the dynamics and challenges of Māori inclusive trade through the CPTPP.

The essence or significant agenda to be achieved in the economic dimension is redistribution, namely the normal ratio of disparity and the achievement of economic equality for all groups of society in a country in a free trade agreement (Fraser, 2008). New Zealand's redistribution in international trade can be seen based on several statistics, such as the level of representation of groups in free trade or group income through free trade, which is influenced by the nature of trade and the leading products of the subject being analyzed.



**Figure 2.** Income gap between Pākehā and other groups.  
Source: MFAT, 2022


Figure 2 shows that, in general, there is an income gap between Pākehā and almost all other groups in New Zealand, including Māori. Based on the graph, Māori are the group with the highest income gap compared to Pākehā.



**Figure 3.** Income and Salary Advantages due to Exports (Pay premium).  
Source: MFAT, 2022


Figure 3 shows the same thing as Figure 2, but with the addition of an extra variable, namely the pay premium. Additional pay is given to workers above the usual standard for specific reasons, such as the level of job risk, special skills, work location, or unusual working hours. The aim is to attract, retain, or provide additional compensation to workers in specific working conditions. However, Māori remain the group with the most significant income gap compared to Pākehā.

Based on Figures 1 and 2, although Māori workers have received a pay premium, they still receive fewer benefits than Pākehā. The difference in benefits can be seen from the difference in income between Māori and Pākehā, which is influenced by various factors, such as concentration in different employment sectors, job level and position, company productivity, etc. Figure 3 shows that the trade pursued by the Māori group is still concentrated in the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries), unlike Pākehā (NZ European), whose industries are no longer focused on a single sector and tend to have larger export values. Figure 4 and 5 highlight significant differences between Māori and non-Māori in terms of leadership in export management and productivity. This indicates that while Māori are actively involved in export businesses (in terms of numbers), the scale of their companies is small, with such businesses contributing only 1% of the total national export value.




**Figure 4.** Sector Concentration in Export Companies.  
Source: MFAT, 2022

Figure 4 shows that trade among Māori groups is still concentrated in the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries), unlike Pākehā (NZ European) industries, which are no longer focused on a single sector and tend to have greater export value. The manufacturing sector is the second-highest concentration after the primary sector in all of the groups except Pākehā.



**Figure 5.** Number of Companies with Majority Māori Ownership.  
Source: MFAT, 2022

Figure 5 shows statistics related to companies led by Māori and non-Māori. Based on numbers, companies led by non-Māori far outnumber those led by Māori. Based on productivity calculated based on company exports, companies led by Māori contribute more than companies led by non-Māori.



**Figure 6.** Average Company Productivity in Companies Led by Māori and Non-Māori.

Source: MFAT, 2022

Figure 6 adds new data on non-exporting companies to understand whether the Māori problem exists only in the international environment or also in the domestic environment. Based on the graph, the steep difference in productivity only occurs in the international environment, namely, in export activities. Taken together, Figures 2–6 illustrate a consistent pattern: although Māori participate in export activities, structural disadvantages limit the economic gains they receive relative to Pākehā.

This concludes that the redistribution gap between Māori and Pākehā in the CPTPP is not only influenced by misrepresentation, but capacity building is also one of the dominant factors in the failure to achieve inclusive trade for Māori. Based on these issues, the following findings pertain to New Zealand's policies from 2019 to 2023 that have a direct impact on achieving inclusive trade for Māori through the CPTPP, particularly through an economic analysis. First, the planning of the "trade for all" and "all for trade" agenda, which focuses on designing solutions to reduce the gap between Māori and Pākehā groups in New Zealand's international trade, including the establishment of the Trade for All Advisory Board (TFAAB). Second, the creation of the Māori Engagement Strategy, Te Hurumanu, and a question-and-answer service regarding exports and imports to enhance Māori capacity building. Third, the creation of various tools on the MFAT Website to facilitate access and planning for Māori in conducting exports or imports (MFAT, 2025; TFAAB, 2019). In conclusion, in the five years since New Zealand joined the CPTPP, the steps taken by the country to achieve inclusive trade through the CPTPP cannot be achieved through the FTA framework alone. Instead, numerous domestic decisions and policies must be made to encourage the potential for inclusive trade to be created.

## 5. Conclusion

In response to the ongoing lawsuits and criticism during the implementation of the CPTPP, based on the government's policies during the 2019–2023 period, New Zealand has shown a shift toward gradually addressing and resolving the dissatisfaction that has prevented the achievement of the desired inclusive trade, particularly among the Māori community. Based on the attitudes and policies demonstrated by the Crown or New Zealand Government, the 2019–

2023 period has been a time when New Zealand has sought to make improvements in implementing the "trade for all" agenda and achieving inclusive trade for all segments of society, especially the Māori community.

This study concludes that, based on three dimensions used to examine Māori inclusive trade through the CPTPP, there was initially a difference in focus between the Crown and the Māori, with the Crown still considering the main issue to be in the economic dimension regarding mis-redistribution as the primary cause of the failure to achieve inclusive trade, as seen in the "trade for all" working paper. However, with the establishment of advisory councils, such as the TFAAB, and the formal Māori claims in the official Waitangi Tribunal report, it has become clear that there is a significant gap in the economic and political dimensions experienced by the Māori people. Free trade agreements can be used as facilitators in achieving inclusive trade. However, there are many requirements and variables for creating a situation in which a country can achieve inclusive trade through FTAs. Some of these requirements include things, such as a country's openness to international trade, how indigenous peoples are represented in FTAs, how domestic policies can protect and encourage all groups of society to participate in FTAs, and how countries can negotiate FTAs to achieve the interests of each group.

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