

# Deconstruction of Local Government Supervisory Function in Illegal Mining Enforcement: A Case Study of Berau Regency

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**Abstract:** *After the enactment of Law No. 3/2020 on Minerba, the authority of district governments in mining supervision and licensing was abolished, creating an imbalance between formal authority and political burden at the local level. This research analyzes how the local government's oversight function of illegal mining (PETI) is exercised, negotiated, or ignored in local political practices in Berau Regency. The method used is qualitative with a case study approach, using primary data from interviews and secondary data from official documents and local media coverage. The results show that PETI supervision in Berau is not ideal. DLHK cannot take action because PETI perpetrators do not have an IUP, so they are not recorded in the formal monitoring system. The absence of official reporting to law enforcement officials reinforces the practice of structured omission. In addition, there are indications of the involvement of unscrupulous officials and economic actors in power compromise. Communities and students responded with resistance, showing a crisis of local legitimacy. In conclusion, the supervision of illegal mining in the regions is not only an administrative issue but also an arena for political conflicts, power relations, and the failure of effective resource governance in the era of decentralization.*

**Keywords:** *Mine Supervision, Illegal Mining, Local Government, Clientelism, Political Legitimacy*

## 1. Introduction

Indonesia has abundant natural resources, including mineral and coal reserves from Sabang to Merauke. Coal as a non-renewable resource plays a strategic role both as domestic energy and a leading export commodity, according to the Statistical Review of World Energy (2025). Indonesia is the fifth largest coal producer in the world, producing more than 1100 million tons in 2024, and a major exporter to India, China, and Japan. This position strengthens Indonesia's role in the global energy market, putting pressure on the governance and sustainability of natural resource exploitation, especially in the regions.

Fiscally, the mining sector contributes significantly to non-tax state revenue (PNBP) of around 13% according to the Ministry of Finance's Fiscal Policy Agency (2024) and is the backbone of local revenue (PAD) for producing regions such as East Kalimantan (Panjaitan et al., 2019). Berau Regency in East Kalimantan is one of the main bases of national coal mining, where the primary coal-bearing rock formation in Berau Regency is the so-called Lati formation, which covers five sub-districts of Tanjung Redeb, Sambaliung, Gunung Tabur, Teluk Bayur, and Segah, containing bituminous-sub-bituminous class coal reserves that have been exploited by large companies such as PT Berau Coal (Coal, 2025). The region's annual production reached 29.6 million tons (2014), and PT Berau Coal's concession was extended to 2035, covering 78,000 hectares (Husaini, 2025). However, amidst the dominance of legal mining, Mining Without Permit (PETI) or illegal mining has increased sharply (Ayubi, 2024; Fatih, 2024).

Figure 1: Mining concession area of PT Berau Coal



Source: accessed on PT Berau Coal website

<https://beraucoalenergy.co.id/our-profile/operation/#!prettyPhoto>

Data from the DLHK of Berau Regency shows that the number of illegal mining points increased dramatically from 24 points in 2022 to 74 points in 2024 (Ayubi, 2024). These mines are spread across Tanjung Redeb, Teluk Bayur, Gunung Tabur, and Sambaliung sub-districts. The existence of PETI not only erodes regional PAD potential and violates the law, but also causes severe environmental damage. Many mining pits are not reclaimed, causing soil and water pollution and increasing the risk of flash floods (Meutia et al., 2023; Musnadi et al., 2024; Rahmawati et al., 2025; Wibowo et al., 2022). These findings are consistent with global studies on the impacts of illegal mining, including water quality degradation, soil degradation, and landscape destruction. Besides ecological impacts, PETI also causes social unrest. Residents report road damage from illicit truck mining traffic, air pollution exacerbating ARI, and land conflicts between communities and mining actors (Meutia et al., 2023; Redi, 2023; Saputri, 2024). Political ecology theory explains how control over space and resources often creates structural conflicts between the state, communities, and corporations, mainly when weak regulations and negligence practices occur (R. Bryant & Bailey, 2005).

Figure 2. Illegal mining location



*Source: Accessed from page detik.com (2024)*

Source: Accessed from page detik.com (2024)

This situation became even more complex after Law No. 3 of 2020 was enacted on Minerba. This law re-centralized the authority of mining licensing and supervision from district/provincial governments to the central government. A study from the University of Indonesia noted that almost all authorities related to IUP, IPR, IUPK, and supervision are in the hands of the center, with little delegation to the provinces. As a result, local governments lose discretionary space to control mining activities in their areas. Local governments are the actors closest geographically and politically to the impact of mining.

In a multilevel governance perspective, this transfer of authority creates institutional disharmony between the center and the regions (Kleider, 2020). District governments remain at the forefront of confronting the social and ecological impacts of mining, but without adequate legal tools to act. This lack of formal authority weakens the political accountability of local governments and widens the gap between normative responsibility and actual capacity (Ji, 2022; Ordonez, 2020). Despite their limited authority, communities still demand that local governments act against illegal mining. Local governments are considered to represent the people directly and are responsible for social peace and environmental sustainability. Under these conditions, the oversight function is structurally weak but politically significant. The failure of local governments to act is often interpreted as political negligence, rather than a lack of administrative authority.

This condition is exacerbated by indications of negligence, weak law enforcement, and potential state capture by local political-economic interests (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2000). Human Rights Watch's 2025 study shows that many local governments in resource-rich regions are trapped in patronage relationships with extractive industry players, thus ignoring law violations (Kippenberg, 2025; Ncube, 2022). Dalam kerangka teori clientelism (Hicken, 2011) and state capture (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2000) shown that private power can co-opt public institutions, making the oversight function an instrument of legitimization rather than control.

In this context, it is essential to deconstruct the meaning and practice of oversight not merely as an administrative procedure, but as a political process within complex power relations. This approach refers to the theory of historical institutionalism (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992) and the concept of power (Foucault, 1982), which sees public policy as the result of contestation and the production of meaning by actors with different interests. This study places the oversight function in local power contestation to analyze how it is exercised, compromised, or negotiated in local governance practices in Berau Regency. This study differs from previous technocratic studies in that it views illegal mining as a conflict-ridden issue of natural resource politics, rather than a legal violation or technical problem. Using a deconstructive approach and political science analysis, this research seeks to contribute to an understanding of natural resource governance based on political accountability and institutional integrity.

## **2. Method**

This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study type to examine how local government oversight functions are carried out, compromised, or negotiated in the context of the politics of illegal mining enforcement in Berau Regency. The case study approach was chosen because it allows researchers to understand contextually and holistically the dynamics of power, institutions, and relations between local actors in monitoring the illegal mining sector (Bennett & Elman, 2007). With this approach, the complexity of the problem is not seen solely as a legal

and administrative issue, but rather as a political issue involving contestation of interests, limits of authority, and institutional practices in the post-decentralization local government system.

The research location focused on Berau Regency, East Kalimantan, as the study area because it is a national strategic coal-producing area, but also faces rampant illegal mining activities (PETI) in several sub-districts such as Tanjung Redeb, Teluk Bayur, Gunung Tabur, and Sambaliung. Research informants were selected purposively, namely those with knowledge, experience, or direct involvement in monitoring or prosecuting illegal mining. The informants consisted of local government officials (Environmental Agency, Energy and Mineral Resources Agency, Satpol PP, Bappeda, and DPRD), environmental activists, local journalists, representatives of affected communities, and traditional leaders or local figures who have socio-political influence at the sub-district or village level.

Data was collected through in-depth interviews, limited participatory observation, and documentation of policies or media reports related to illegal mining practices. Interviews were open-ended and semi-structured, exploring informants' narratives, experiences, and perceptions of the local government's supervisory role, obstacles, and practices. Researchers also reviewed documents such as local regulations, RPJMD, minutes of inspections, official statements, and media reports on PETI issues in Berau as part of data triangulation and interpretation supplementation.

Data was analyzed using a qualitative thematic analysis approach (Mackiewicz, 2018), exploring the main themes from the empirical data: institutional oversight, local power relations, non-state actor intervention, structural neglect, and local political legitimacy. The analysis was conducted through coding, categorization, and in-depth interpretation of supervisory practices in the field. It was linked to theoretical frameworks such as political ecology, clientelism, and multilevel governance.

To maintain the validity of the data, researchers triangulated sources and methods, including comparing narratives between actors, and verifying facts through credible documents and media coverage (Elfenbein & Schwarze, 2020). In addition, the member checking process was carried out by asking several key informants to confirm the results of the researcher's interpretation to ensure that the narratives built authentically represent their experiences and positions. With this strategy, the research is expected to make theoretical and practical contributions in understanding how local government oversight functions of illegal mining are carried out in a complex and institutionally fragmented local political landscape.

### **3. Result and Discussion**

#### **1. Institutional Configuration and Politics of Local Government Supervision after Law No. 3/2020**

The enactment of Law Number 3 of 2020 concerning Amendments to Law Number 4 of 2009 concerning Mineral and Coal Mining has fundamentally changed the institutional configuration in mining management in Indonesia, including at the local government level. One of the significant changes is the transfer of authority for licensing, guidance, and supervision of mining businesses from district/city governments to the central government through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Article 35 and Article 93 of the Law confirm that mining business

licenses (IUP), including supervision of the implementation of mining activities, are now the central government's authority and only partially delegated to the provincial government. This change has led to the termination of the district government's direct supervisory function, including in cases of illegal mining without an IUP. As revealed in a report by the DLHK of Berau Regency (2024), local technical agencies cannot take legal action against illegal mining because the activities are not registered in the official licensing system and are therefore considered “beyond the scope of structural authority” (Ayubi, 2024).

Politically, this change is essential because it creates an imbalance between formal authority and the burden of socio-political responsibility that remains with local governments. In the context of illegal mining, local communities directly affected by environmental damage, land conflicts, and infrastructure disruption continue to hold the district government accountable. This creates a legitimacy crisis at the regional level, where local governments are in a dilemma: they have no formal authority, but are still held publicly accountable. This condition is relevant to analyze using the multilevel governance approach (Kleider, 2020), which emphasizes the importance of harmonizing authority between levels of government in strategic sector governance. This lack of synchronization between central authority and regional capacity also reinforces the argument from historical institutionalism (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992) that changes to rules without considering local institutional realities can weaken policy effectiveness and increase room for conflict in implementation.

Law No. 3/2020 on Mineral and Coal Mining is a revision of Law No. 4/2009 that emphasizes the centralization of the mining sector management under the central government's control. Several crucial articles in this law explicitly revoke the authority of district/city-level regions in terms of licensing and supervision of mining. Article 35 and Article 38 state that mining business licenses (IUP) can only be issued by the central or provincial governments upon specific delegations. Furthermore, Article 93 confirms that supervision of the implementation of mining activities is also the central government's authority, with limited coordination space for local governments. With this legal framework, district governments no longer have the legal standing to issue new licenses or supervise mining activities, including prosecuting illegal mining.

The consequences of this authority restructuring are felt at the district level, as is the case in Berau Regency. Information from Berau's Environment and Hygiene Agency (DLHK) states that they cannot act against illegal mining activities because they are carried out without an IUP, so they are not recorded in the official system that the regional technical agency can supervise. When mining activities do not have an official permit, they fall outside the scope of administrative supervision. This shows that precisely because there is no formal legality, the space for supervisory action by the local government is closed. DLHK can only give “appeals” or “directions” to the perpetrators, without being able to carry out administrative sanctions or official reporting to law enforcement officials. In this case, the local government faces a situation where supervision is structurally impossible, but politically demanded.

This condition reflects the “institutional disconnection” logic in resource governance that is not synchronized between the formal legal level and practical needs on the ground. From the perspective of governance theory, local governments lose the capability of state instruments to

act (Pierre & Peters, 2000) In the framework of state fragmentation, supervision becomes vulnerable to omission and manipulation by informal actors. The space left by the absence of formal oversight creates a gap that illegal mining exploits to thrive, as reflected by the increase in the number of illegal mining points in Berau from 24 points in 2022 to 74 points in 2024 (Ayubi, 2024). This fragmentation of authority directly weakens the effectiveness of mine supervision, opens space for social conflict, and erodes the legitimacy of local government institutions in the eyes of the local public.

The local government's situation monitoring illegal mining in Berau Regency shows a loss of administrative authority and reflects severe governance disharmony in a multilevel governance system. Multilevel governance theory (Kleider, 2020) explains that public sector management in a complex country like Indonesia should involve synergy between the government-national, provincial, and district levels. However, in practice, the relationship between these levels shows incoherence, both vertically (center-local) and horizontally (between agencies at the local level). When the center takes over oversight without establishing a functional coordination mechanism with the local government, it results in fragmentation of authority, where each actor operates independently and cannot act in an integrated manner (Keast & Brown, 2002; Zhang et al., 2019).

This condition is clearly illustrated in the case of handling illegal mining in Berau Regency. Although Berau's Forkopimda held a coordination meeting to discuss measures against PETI activities, no concrete follow-up was done afterwards. Furthermore, the regional police were not present in the formal coordination forum initiated by the district government, even though their presence is crucial in law enforcement. The non-involvement of law enforcement officers not only weakens the position of the local government institutionally but also emphasizes the failure of cross-sector coordination, which, from the perspective of Multilevel Governance, is an indicator of low institutional integration in public governance (Kleider, 2020). This lack of coordination exacerbates the fragmentation of oversight, allowing illegal mining to grow in spaces left open by inefficient relationships between levels of government.

Illegal mining in Berau Regency reflects legal and institutional issues and a political issue of oversight full of dilemmas. On the one hand, the local government has lost most of its formal functions due to changes in national regulations. On the other hand, the community continues to hold the local government as the leading actor responsible for the environmental damage, social disruption, and economic impacts of illegal mining activities. The insistence of local communities, including students, traditional leaders and affected villagers, shows that the public perception of local government is still strong as a political representation that must be present to protect collective interests. This creates a gap in expectations, where the formal capacity of local governments is no longer balanced with the burden of political responsibility they bear on the ground.

In this condition, there is a local legitimacy crisis, namely the inability of local institutions to respond to community expectations due to structural limitations. Pierre & Peters (2000), in the concept of political accountability, emphasize that government legitimacy comes from compliance with the law and responsiveness to community needs and pressures. When local

governments cannot provide concrete action on PETI activities, public trust in the capacity of the local state decreases. The fact that Berau's local government can only “appeal” to illegal miners without having a formal basis to take firm action shows a loss of substantive authority in supervisory functions. This condition opens up space for the delegitimization of local power, where the state is considered negligent or absent in situations of social and ecological crisis.

Furthermore, this problem can be read through the framework of institutionalism, especially the historical institutionalism approach (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992), which explains that institutions are often trapped in “institutional trajectories” that limit actors' flexibility in responding to new dynamics. Local governments, in this case, are in an institutional framework that limits their capacity to act (because they have been deprived of authority), but at the same time remain burdened by socio-political pressures from below. Pressure from the community for local governments to act, without a clear regulative space to act, creates tension between legal structures and political realities at the regional level (Pierson, 2000; Sayers & Lucas, 2017). This tension makes the politics of monitoring illegal mining not just a technical or administrative issue, but a terrain of conflicting meanings between popular expectations and the institutional boundaries of the regional state.

After the enactment of Law No. 3/2020, there has been a severe imbalance between the formal authority structure and the political burden of local governments, especially in the context of illegal mining supervision. On the one hand, local governments no longer have the legality to issue permits, conduct technical supervision, or impose administrative sanctions on mining activities, as all authority has been centralized at the central level. On the other hand, district governments remain the first to face social and ecological pressures from PETI activities, both from directly affected communities and from public opinion that questions the partiality and capacity of the local state. This mismatch between the burden of social responsibility and the available legal instruments creates the so-called governance gap, which is the gap between formal authority and public expectations of the performance of public institutions (Gains et al., 2005).

In this position, local governments are politically “locked” into governance structures that are not adaptive and responsive to the complexity of the illegal mining problem. They do not have enough space to act, but cannot avoid social pressure. This concept can be understood through a structural constraint theory approach, which explains how institutions are shaped and constrained by hierarchical and inflexible policy structures (Kluvers & Tippett, 2010). In the case of Berau, national policies created an inadequate governance situation locally, exposing weaknesses in the design of sectoral decentralization in mining. As the number of illegal mining hotspots increases from 24 in 2022 to 74 in 2024 (Ayubi, 2024), the local government is in a dilemma: unable to control, but constantly blamed. This tension indicates that legal reform in the mining sector has failed to integrate local dimensions into national governance design effectively.

## **2. Practices of Negotiation, Omission, and Resistance in the Monitoring Function of Illegal Mining at the Local Level**

The previous discussion has explained how the institutional and governance structure after Law No. 3/2020 created an imbalance of authority that trapped local governments in a limited governance space, so this section will discuss further the real practices in the field related to how the function of monitoring illegal mining is carried out, negotiated, or even left. This discussion addresses formal institutional aspects and explores the dynamics of power relations, interests, and local political responses to pressure from the community and economic actors. In this context, supervision is not just an administrative obligation, but a political field full of compromise, conflict, and resistance.

In practice, supervision of unlicensed mining activities (PETI) at the local level falls far short of the normative provisions set out in the legislation. Although supervision is theoretically part of the mining governance system, the reality shows that local governments, particularly in Berau Regency, do not have adequate formal or institutional mechanisms to crack down on PETI activities. The Berau Environmental and Hygiene Agency (DLHK) stated that they are aware of the exact location and existence of illegal mines, but cannot take action because there is no legal basis governing the supervision of unlicensed activities (DLHK Berau, 2023). As these mines are not registered in the Mining Business License (IUP) system, they are administratively outside the scope of DLHK's authority. This creates a gray area in governance, where known violations are legally and administratively unreachable.

This situation is a form of regulatory void or unclear authority in regulating sectors requiring intensive supervision. In the framework of governance theory (Sahramäki & Kankaanranta, 2023), this is referred to as a form of administrative inertia (Wagner, 2010), bureaucratic inertia that is unable to act despite knowing violations, due to the absence of legal instruments or coordination between agencies (Pierre & Peters, 2000). DLHK can only provide appeals or advice to perpetrators, without the capacity to impose administrative sanctions, close the location, or formally report to law enforcement officials. When supervision is limited only to ceremonial and rhetorical, the state's function as a controller of extractive activities does not run substantively. This weakens public trust and expands the space for PETI, which not only damages the environment but also challenges state authority at the local level.

The disconnect between local administrative authorities and law enforcement officials also exacerbates the limited oversight of illegal mining in Berau Regency. As explained by Berau's DLHK, PETI activities cannot be officially monitored because they are not recorded in the government's licensing system (IUP). This creates a paradox: because the mine is illegal and unlicensed, it is not included in the list of objects that local technical institutions can supervise. As a result, DLHK and related agencies have no regulative footing to take action, despite knowing firsthand that the activity is taking place in the field. This reflects a real form of what is referred to as a regulatory void, namely a vacuum of authority and legal instruments that should bridge between supervision and enforcement in the context of public law violations (Short, 2013).

Furthermore, the omission is also reinforced by the absence of a formal report from the local government to the police (Polres Berau). In field interviews quoted from research documents, Polres stated that legal action against illegal mining cannot be carried out without a formal report from the local government or the owner of the permit area (e.g., PT Berau Coal). The local government considers that it cannot submit a legal report because it does not have formal authority. There is what Pierre & Peters (2000) call administrative inertia, which is bureaucratic inaction due to inter-agency responsibility shifting, which ultimately opens up space for structural negligence. In this context, the local state appears present but ineffective, while illegal activities continue unhindered. This situation creates a surveillance gray zone, where formal laws lose their reach due to systemic institutional deadlock.

Furthermore, the weak supervision of illegal mining in Berau Regency cannot be separated from indications of power compromise practices between state and local economic actors. Mining activities outside official concessions but can still operate and sell their products to specific buyers indicate an institutional tolerance that cannot be explained only through administrative aspects. This condition shows a pattern of neglect that is not merely the result of a legal vacuum, but also of informally negotiated power relations and interests, where the continuation of PETI practices is exchanged for political stability or other short-term benefits for local elites.

This situation can be read using two critical concepts in political science: clientelism and state capture. Clientelism, as explained by Hicken (2011), refers to a pattern of reciprocal relationships between politicians and economic or social actors, where state resources, including the authority to enforce the law, are exchanged for political support, protection, or omission. In the context of Berau, the omission of illegal mining may be part of an informal political compromise aimed at maintaining electoral stability or local power coalitions. Meanwhile, state capture (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2000) describes a situation where private economic actors significantly influence the making and implementation of public policies in favor of personal or group interests. When illegal mining distribution channels continue to run smoothly without legal barriers, and public officials do not take decisive action despite having information, it appears that oversight no longer works as an instrument of the state but as part of an arena that private interests have captured. In this context, the local state is ignorant and has been hijacked by forces outside formal institutions.

In the face of rampant illegal mining activities that the local government has not dealt with firmly, forms of social resistance have emerged from below, both overtly and covertly. One striking example is the protest of students from the Samarinda branch of KPMKB, who actively highlighted the illegal coal trucks use of public roads. They strongly criticized the condition of the streets, which were severely damaged by mining truck traffic, and voiced community concerns regarding dust and noise pollution in residential areas. Meanwhile, residents around Sambaliung, Gunung Tabur, and Teluk Bayur sub-districts complained about environmental degradation and land conflicts, but received no firm response from the local government. When the government was passive, the community took matters into their own hands, through social pressure, media complaints, and informal roadblocks.

This phenomenon reflects the logic of political ecology, namely that conflicts over natural resources are not merely about economics or the environment, but also about who has the right to access, manage, and benefit from a particular space (R. L. Bryant & Bailey, 1997). In this context, communities face environmental damage and feel their rights as citizens are violated by the institutional neglect of PETI perpetrators. In addition, resistance practices that emerge are not always in the form of large protests or political mobilization, but also everyday forms such as silent rejection, citizen reporting, or minor sabotage of illegal mining distribution channels. This aligns with everyday politics (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009), which emphasizes that resistance can appear in local expressions that are not formally organized but reflect a rejection of structural injustice. Thus, monitoring illegal mining is also a meeting point between the state's failure and local communities' political expression in defending their living space.

Oversight of illegal mining at the local level, particularly in Berau Regency, occurs under conditions far from ideal. The absence of formal oversight mechanisms, neglect by bureaucratic apparatus, and weak inter-institutional coordination create a situation where the law loses control over illegal extractive activities. As explained in various field findings, local governments are aware of the existence of PETI, but have no authority to act because there is no legal basis attached to activities without an IUP. This condition is exacerbated by the absence of official reporting to the police and the passive attitude of law enforcement officials who wait for formal delegation. In this context, supervision is hampered by regulations and institutional realities that cannot build adequate responses to ongoing violations.

Furthermore, structured omission practices, power negotiations between the state and illegal mining actors, and community resistance show that the supervision function cannot be understood solely as an administrative or technical matter. Instead, illegal mining supervision is a complex political process, where various actors ranging from local officials, law enforcement officials, business actors, to civil society are involved in the dynamics of power bargaining, protection of economic interests, and expressions of resistance from below. Within the framework of governance politics theory (Pierre & Peters, 2000), the oversight function is part of the contestation arena between state legitimacy, social pressure, and the infiltration of private interests. This emphasizes that oversight is not the domain of a neutral bureaucracy, but a political terrain full of interests, compromises, and resistance, which shapes the face of natural resource governance at the local level.

#### **4. Conclusion**

This research shows that the local government's supervisory function over illegal mining activities (PETI) in Berau Regency is structurally and politically problematic. After the enactment of Law No. 3/2020, the district government's authority in mining licensing and supervision has been revoked and centralized to the national level, creating a regulatory void at the local level. Berau's DLHK, as one of the leading technical agencies, has no formal basis to crack down on illegal mining, as the perpetrators are not registered in the IUP system. As a result, supervision is only done symbolically through appeals, with no law enforcement capacity.

This reality is exacerbated by weak coordination between regional actors, including the police, indications of power compromise, and the involvement of informal actors such as illegal coal dealers. The practice of clientelism and state capture is seen through the omission of illegal

activities for the sake of economic interests or local political stability. On the other hand, resistance from communities and students emerged as a form of pressure against the absence of the state, reflecting the tension between people's expectations and regional institutional capacity.

This finding implies the need for a redesign of mining supervision governance that is adaptive to the local context and does not entirely ignore the role of district governments in the decentralization system. This research contributes to the study of political science, especially in the issues of multilevel governance, political accountability, and conflict over natural resources, by providing empirical illustrations of how the supervisory vacuum becomes a space for politicization and social strife. Future research is recommended to explore further informal practices that shape the dynamics of relations between state and non-state actors in natural resource management, including the involvement of local political-economic elites in weak oversight structures.

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