KONFIGURASI KEWENANGAN PENGUJIAN KONSTITUSIONALITAS UNDANG-UNDANG: STUDI KOMPARATIF ANTARA MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI REPUBLIK INDONESIA DAN MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA

CONFIGURATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AUTHORITY OVER LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA

Abstract

Constitutional review is a fundamental instrument in modern constitutional systems, yet its institutional design differs between Indonesia’s centralized model and Malaysia’s decentralized system. This study aims to comparatively analyze the configuration of constitutional review authority exercised by the Constitutional Court of Indonesia and the Federal Court of Malaysia, as well as the challenges arising from its implementation. Using a normative legal method with comparative and conceptual approaches, this research examines key doctrines such as constitutional supremacy, negative legislator, judicial overreach, and ouster clause. The findings indicate that Indonesia’s centralized system, characterized by exclusive authority, final decisions, and direct access, concentrates judicial power and creates a structural tendency toward judicial overreach, potentially undermining the separation of powers and leading to ineffective (dead letter) decisions. In contrast, Malaysia’s decentralized system, while flexible, allows legislative mechanisms such as ouster clauses to limit judicial review and weaken constitutional supremacy. These structural conditions provide the normative basis for concluding that Indonesia requires strengthened judicial self-restraint, whereas Malaysia necessitates firm judicial resistance to ouster clauses to preserve effective constitutional control.